These expectations are not just operationally relevant, but are a core element of Civil Affairs’ DoD
mandate. As clearly stated in DoDD 2000.13:
“Civil Affairs operations may be conducted to support
national policies and interests as part of an interagency, bilateral, or multinational military or political-military operation, in accordance with law and consistent
with applicable DoD policy and issuances.”
This expands on the experiences gained from the
World War II-era FM 27-5 on Military Governance and
Civil Affairs, which presciently noted the fact that military governance isn’t specifically a task for times of
war. CA will always be expected to stand ready to
accomplish missions in support of other U.S. Government entities in line with its core tasks and functional areas. The National Defense Strategy further
reinforces this expectation, emphasizing the need
for providing “a Stabilizing Presence” and building
upon capabilities developed since 2001.8 Civil Affairs’
utilization from these recent conflicts are directly at
odds with CA’s supposed stated mission, as CA was
often expected to replicate non-DoD assets in theater
to give the supported commander his own capabilities instead of simply partnering to take advantage of
the skills and missions of USAID and DoS initiatives.
These directives clearly outline the expectations for
Civil Affairs, and can be leveraged to support the justification for additional interagency training links.
The CA proponency has begun work on developing this link with the Institute for Military Support to
Governance.9 This effort proves that elements within
CA leadership already understand that the true subject matter experts for CA’s functional areas lie in the
civilian world. It should, therefore, be very simple to
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