and share its most important operational information.
The raw data, analysis, and products from these many
years of conflict are scattered across a range of databases and systems such as Tactical Ground Reporting System (TIGR), Combined Information Database
Network Exchange (CIDNE), Geographic Information
Systems (GIS), the Asymmetrical Software Kit (ASK)
and Mapping the Human Terrain (MAP-HT), not to
mention Excel spreadsheets and PowerPoint slides. In
addition to these systems, the AC 95th BDE has developed the Civil Affairs Operating System (CAOS) for
its own operations, and other stopgap theater-specific
options are still being created and employed. The result has been an inability to aggregate and analyze
Civil Affairs Operations and Civil Information across
provinces, years, or initiatives. In a sly historical reference, Afghanistan is commonly referred to as the
“graveyard of databases.”
The authors strongly believe that effective CIM
is the basis by which CA, along all operational lines,
brings relevance and value to the combatant commander and non-military agencies. CA is uniquely qualified
to integrate and analyze disparate data sources from a
complex civil environment, and to maintain this information for future operations. Any attempt to bridge
these CA communities will fail without an acknowledgement of the need for the aforementioned Active
and Reserve CA, non-CA military, and non-military
actors in a theater to share and analyze data in a common and sustained format. These organizations must
make progress towards a single common operational
picture in support of commanders and other affected
leaders. Simply put, and as a first step towards some
form of unification, CA must address this single glaring operational issue.
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