These missions rapidly impacted readiness and
the overall effectiveness of CA as a branch. Units
rarely deployed together, and non-CA Soldiers were
regularly tasked with typical CA tasks such as: project management; collecting civil reconnaissance; and,
conducting foreign humanitarian assistance. Senior
leadership positions were filled with re-classed individuals sent through two-week Civil Affairs courses
immediately prior to leading units in combat, and rosters were intermittently filled out with Inactive Ready
Reserve augmentees. The AC was forced to fill CA positions with Field Artillery officers, while intelligence
sections were tasked with covering down on the unfamiliar task of Civil Information Management. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were frequently led
by the Navy and Air Force officers, and parallel organizations such as Human Terrain Teams were created
in an effort to offset CA’s workload.
Civil Affairs can view its ability to meet OPTEMPO demands with some pride, but it is essential to understand that these temporary structures were created
both in support of Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) and
Civil Military Operations (CMO) and to cover real
and perceived deficiencies. No matter the purpose, it
remains the Army’s continual mission to adjust and
grow based on lessons learned. The drawdown of
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan allows a respite from
the experiences of the past decade of war, but CA and
the Army must learn from these experiences in order
to address these deficiencies in an era of declining resources. History has shown us that CA forces will continue to be called on in times of instability and conflict,
despite claims that these missions are solely civilian
endeavors.1 As such, this response to lessons learned
must be completed before subsequent (and inevitable)
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