tween 2005 and 2009 took precedence over functional
specialists. To meet demand, the Department of Defense turned to the individual ready reserve, internal
cross-leveling, and Navy and Air Force “shake and
bake” CA personnel. CA partners in the field, expecting specialists, were often disappointed. As noted at
the Symposium, the inability to deliver on the promise
of functional specialists became a “black eye” for CA.
In order to meet demand in Afghanistan and Iraq,
the U.S. revisited a civil-military model it had used
in Vietnam, by reconceiving the Joint Civil-military
operations Task Force (JCMOTF) as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs included civilians from
the State Department and other agencies as well as
military civil-military personnel. However, by 2003
these were already in such seriously short supply that
PRTs were often commanded by a Navy commander
or Air Force lieutenant colonel. In 2005-6 the Army established a Human Terrain System comprised mostly
of contracted civilians to develop sociocultural knowledge for combat commanders in Afghanistan and
Iraq, including Human Terrain Teams deploying with
tactical units.
In the midst of a military surge in Afghanistan in
2010, the United States conducted a “civilian surge”
that tripled the number of diplomats and civilian
workers including experts in law, governance and
agriculture, to more than 1,100. Surprisingly missing from this surge effort was an organizati