Conclusion
Some government capabilities are used episodically rather than continuously. Prior to the Decade
of War, Civil Affairs often found itself in such a situation. We can take solace that over the past quarter
century, the United States has used its CA assets to
minimize circumstances that promote conflict and to
hasten the recovery from conflict. But we cannot avoid
concluding that protracted expeditionary operations
call for CA capacity far beyond that needed for peacetime engagement. Recent deployments demonstrate
that specific service environments call for expertise attuned to the elements they support: fitting in a service
culture facilitates trust building, just as civilian experience eases the civil-military, whole-of-government,
whole-of-society interaction that characterizes CA
operations.
When RC CA personnel were scheduled for release
from active duty but demands for the function continued, DoD opted to (1) school Air Force and Navy
personnel in CA operations and (2) expand Army,
Navy, and Marine capacity in both active and reserve
components. In current circumstances, there is a predictable call to reduce the size of the military. Marine
Corps lessons offer continuing support for expanded
CA structure, and Army RC reductions across the
force are likely to be smaller than for AC. With fewer
troops deployed, supporting CA operations will also
decline, but the need for planning CA or CA related
capabilities remains. If CA planning capacity is inadequate, we can predict that combatant commands
will ignore the broader civil society in which military
interventions occur, and we will find future leaders
again assailing the inability to understand the operational environment.
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