The Navy justified disbanding MCAST by indicating the presence of mission capabilities in “other Department of Defense agencies,”4 and, indeed, a number
of the tasks MCAG and MCAST undertook have been
conducted by Army elements. But the maritime environment is likely to be served more effectively by CA
forces attuned to the characteristics of that environment, notably in addressing functional specialties in
maritime CA. The WW II example of the Navy captain
serving as port marine superintendent thus echoes in
the era of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa.
The maritime flavor of CA is notable in the source
of requests for MCAG/MCAST. Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and Global Fleet Stations called
for MCAT deployments in every GCC. As is true of
CA in the other services, MCAG/MCAST, which often comprised both AC and RC personnel, undertook
whole-of-government approaches to their missions.
The learning trajectory of MCAG/MCAST is highly instructive. Experience in the Horn of Africa highlights maritime dimensions that are replicable in stability and counterinsurgency operations elsewhere. In
2008, for example, MCAST began a program in Kenya
called Community Watch on the Water. By 2011 the
program transitioned to Kenyan control. A significant
outcome of this effort is evident in improved relations
between government agencies and the fishing industry. In 2008, Kenyan public perception was of government authorities as oppressive. By 2010, the two
sides in this conflict were relying on each other. The
experience in Kenya is applicable to the U.S. Pacific
Command as well, particularly in Indonesia and the
Philippines, where counter-piracy and illicit fishing
are regional issues.
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