Civil Affairs Issue Papers Volume 1, 2014-2015 Civil Affairs Issue Papers | Page 38

The Navy justified disbanding MCAST by indicating the presence of mission capabilities in “other Department of Defense agencies,”4 and, indeed, a number of the tasks MCAG and MCAST undertook have been conducted by Army elements. But the maritime environment is likely to be served more effectively by CA forces attuned to the characteristics of that environment, notably in addressing functional specialties in maritime CA. The WW II example of the Navy captain serving as port marine superintendent thus echoes in the era of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. The maritime flavor of CA is notable in the source of requests for MCAG/MCAST. Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and Global Fleet Stations called for MCAT deployments in every GCC. As is true of CA in the other services, MCAG/MCAST, which often comprised both AC and RC personnel, undertook whole-of-government approaches to their missions. The learning trajectory of MCAG/MCAST is highly instructive. Experience in the Horn of Africa highlights maritime dimensions that are replicable in stability and counterinsurgency operations elsewhere. In 2008, for example, MCAST began a program in Kenya called Community Watch on the Water. By 2011 the program transitioned to Kenyan control. A significant outcome of this effort is evident in improved relations between government agencies and the fishing industry. In 2008, Kenyan public perception was of government authorities as oppressive. By 2010, the two sides in this conflict were relying on each other. The experience in Kenya is applicable to the U.S. Pacific Command as well, particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines, where counter-piracy and illicit fishing are regional issues. 19