strategic (diplomatic) benefits. If long-term outcomes
are an underappreciated metric of success, surely international legitimacy that validates an intervener’s
claims of improving the geopolitical environment is a
key factor in any dispassionate evaluation of results.
MG Hashem provided examples of strategic impact, i.e., achieving the political end of a military operation. Reflecting on operational-level briefings during
Operations Joint Forge/Joint Guard, MG Hashem noted
that of four daily briefers to the NATO Stabilization
Force (SFOR) commander—each of three Multinational Divisions and the Combined-Joint, Civil-Military Task Force—the CJCMTF “was the one organization talking about anything of substance.” From the
perspective of military maneuver and engagement,
SFOR’s operational environment was static, therefore
“nothing significant to report” (NSTR) is a positive
achievement in peacekeeping.
But the geopolitical outcome that enables a transition to civil authority rests in the domain that capitalizes on a positive security environment to achieve
a suitable advancement in economic and governance
conditions. Once an intervening force has established
a secure environment, civil society needs to resume its
economic and social activity. Military planners usually expect a transition authority to shepherd this development, but security and civil-society activity are
so intertwined that the military occupier—whether
benign or belligerent—cannot escape a shared responsibility for conditions that facilitate the transition to
sovereignty.
MG Hashem raised concerns for DoD-wide infusion of Civil Affairs in military planning and execution
and notes actions underway at U.S. Special Operations Command that address both SOF-GPF integra-
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