also clearly elicit the “whole-of-society” equities
found in the Reserves. These attributes are even more
applicable to emerging security cooperation and security assistance operations increasingly performed by
general purpose Forces in Regionally Aligned Force
and “building partner capacity” missions as well as in
Special Operations “persistent engagement” missions.
Reserve CA, in particular, embodies the longstanding national treasure of the citizen-soldier. Reserve
Civil Affairs, which comprises 85% of Army Civil Affairs and an even higher percentage among Marines,
bring specific civilian skill sets – and a civilian mindset – difficult and financially challenging to duplicate
in the active component. These forces also bring the
ability to access as well as influence whole-of-society
actors and activities that are center-of-mass of Phase 0
(Shape and Influence) as well as transition from conflict to peace (Phase 4 and 5) – otherwise known in
broader (civilian) terms as conflict prevention, conflict
transformation, and peacebuilding, respectively.
While capabilities have grown among other services, the majority of Civil Affairs capability still comes
from the Army with land power remaining most suited
to integrate all elements of national power, especially
before and after the outbreak of violent conflict. All of
the Nation’s strategic and operational CA capability,
however, is in the Army, while about 90% of that is in
USACAPOC (A).
Restructuring USAR Civil Affairs forces in a big
way is imminent and unavoidable, many suggested.
Among many things, as Saiduddin mentioned, doctrinal Reserve CA – Active command concepts of integration and support-to-supported relations based on
Cold War era assumptions about civil-military operations (i.e., high intensity warfare concerns about minimizing civilian interference with operations) must be
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