As the second panel surmised, although it is unlikely that DoD will reconsider the CA “divorce” from
SOF, its repercussions have had a negative impact on
Army CA, notably reduced funding and support for
RC CA units and less interaction between AC and
RC CA. Long and Hansen added that “calls to restore
Army CA under a unifying command are politically
charged and unlikely.” Beyond the well-known decisions leading to a disjointed Army force, the Symposium also viewed the Navy’s decision to eliminate
the entire Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Force
Assistance Teams as a strategic error, reflecting a lack
of understanding of the global reach and the benefits
to theater engagement that this small force generated.
While DoD may or may not broach the overarching
subjects of executive authority, proponent office, and
so on, the consensus was that, for the meantime, the
community should look more at issues of force balance and integration along especially Active-Reserve
and Special Operations - General Purpose Force lines.
With regard to balance and integration, the papers
are rich with ideas. Ringing loud and clear from all
three periods the panels represented was how “deliberative methodical Civil Affairs planning at all levels
and phases of military operations was a key to success.” A more mindful approach to Civil Information
Management, Marco Bongioanni explained in his paper, would go far to improve CA’s ability to integrate
across numerous lines of coordination.
And while growing demand for Civil Affairs capabilities calls for more readily available Active Component CA forces for theater security cooperation and
contingency missions, including the presence of CA
planners at major and maneuver commands, the challenges of the strategic and operational environments
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