context as well as with an understanding of operational lessons. “Once we satisfactorily understand the
problem set,” Gordon wrote, “we can then develop
the DOTMLPF needed.”
The good news, the third panel observed, is that
it is “no longer the situation that most senior leaders
do not understand the value of Civil Affairs.” Thus,
there is a unique historic opportunity to maintain this
national strategic capability at relatively low cost not
only for contingencies, but for steady-state engagement activities, including Special Operations “persistent engagement” missions, that can help the Army
fulfill its strategic role of “Prevent” and “Shape” as
well as “Win” and thus prevent or mitigate large-scale
deployments of general purpose forces for low or high
intensity combat operations. If, properly managed,
organized, maintained, educated, trained, authorized,
and resourced both combat capability and military
operational capabilities can be enhanced. Hence the
need for emphasis on personnel and training as stated
by the Commander of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs &
Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), or
USACAPOC(A).
Third, other than issues relating to the martial principle of unity of command, the most urgent areas of
focus for Civil Affairs are Active/Reserve and Special Operations/General Purpose Forces integration.
The prevailing mood of the Symposium, especially
among the third panel, “might be characterized as a
moment of acceptance of institutional conditions and,
at the same time, investment in small scale, practical
steps to strengthen the community.”
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