to operational versus strategic requirements – and
thus managed operationally versus strategically. As
Long and Hansen noted in their paper, management
of CA has reflected consistent violation of the truths
and imperatives of Special Operations. These include:
humans are more important than hardware; quality is
better than quantity; Special Operations Forces cannot
be mass produced; and, competent Special Operations
Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.
Given the growing and not diminishing need of
the Joint Force to deal with complex peace and security environments and Phase 0 operations involving
security cooperation, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding in coordination with an even greater array of
civilian partners, Civil Affairs must evolve and adapt
to these emerging imperatives which will require the
CA force to work more collaboratively, multilaterally, with and through country teams, as Saiduddin
explained. Among his recommendations is adding
Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) to
the list of CA core tasks.
From the perspective of being a national strategic
capability, a rebalancing and overhaul of all of Civil
Affairs along “DOTMLPF-P” (doctrine, organization,
training, material, leadership, education, and policy)
lines is in the offing. Army Reserve CA in particular
has been far from ideally structured under DOTMLPFP and is not integrated strategically and operationally
with active component CA and interagency partners.
But any reconfiguration of Civil Affairs forces –
universal or otherwise – must capitalize on the tremendous operational experience CA has earned in
more than a Decade of War as well as its enduring
strategic and operational roles and value added capability. Moreover, it must be done within a strategic
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