skilled, language trained, regional experts. This level
of training cannot take place overnight and will result
in a continual shortage of qualified CA personnel.
Furthermore, the troop to task alignment needs to be
more flexible than the current construct that aligns a
CA battalion with a brigade combat team. This alignment often results in either too little or too many CA
soldiers tasked against a problem set.16 To be fair, this
concept of integration was developed for high intensity warfare when maneuver forces are not focused on
Civil Military Operations (CMO) and minimizing civilian interference with operations is considered more
of a priority than influencing a population. Additionally, institutional knowledge of CMO has historically been limited within maneuver forces. Much has
changed in the training and experience of maneuver
officers over the past decade of conducting Counterinsurgency (COIN) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Operating
in the human domain is now part of maneuver institutional training. Today’s maneuver officers are so well
versed in COIN that senior leaders in the maneuver
community have concerns that the schoolhouse has
not been focusing enough on high intensity warfare.
The time is right to build on this knowledge and
further institutionalize CMO within the conventional
force. The new Army Operating Concept stresses the
concept of Regionally Aligned Brigades. This necessitates a closer relationship with regionally aligned
Special Warfare forces, and the issue of Special Operations Forces - Conventional Forces - Joint, Interagency,
Intergovernmental and Multinational (SOF-CF-JIIM)
integration is a priority topic for senior leadership.
A framework for integration has been outlined in
the Strategic Landpower white paper and developed
further through joint exercises such as Silent Quest.17
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