and Afghanistan, there are limitations on our ability
to create stability by training host nation forces. Traditional military training exercises with partner nation
forces may not be enough to disrupt a complex political awakening or influence a population.4
Our greatest challenge for the foreseeable future
will remain countering violent extremist ideology.
Without fully understanding regional and cultural
dynamics and developing our ability to wage what
can best be described as “political warfare,” we are
likely to struggle with irregular conflicts while our
adversaries wage unconventional warfare campaigns
against us. In a resource-constrained national security
environment, preventing future conflicts will be more
important than our ability to dominate a maneuver
battlefield. More importantly, there is a strong reluctance by policy makers, and the American public, to
become involved in large scale counterinsurgency operations, limiting our strategic options.
In response to these challenges, the Army changed
its operating concept from “AirLand Battle” to “Win
in a Complex World.” An important part of this new
operating concept is regional engagement.5
Engagement typically takes place in what we describe as “Phase 0,” the doctrinal term used to describe
the steady state environment before a conflict begins.
Phase 0 is also the time were potential conflicts can
be identified and often mitigated before armed conflict ensues. Consistent with this concept, Civil Affairs
(CA) personnel have the potential to take the lead in
the Phase 0 environment, but the force as currently
structured lacks the ability to take on this challenge.
At present, approximately 84% of the total Army CA
force is oriented towards supporting conventional
forces engaged in high intensity warfare and post
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