7. Hague Regulations (1907), Arts. 42-56; Geneva Civilians
Convention (1949), Arts. 47-78.
8. See e.g., Ted Spain and Terry Turchie, Breaking Iraq: The
Ten Mistakes That Broke Iraq (Palisades, NY: History Publishing
Company, 2013); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military
Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); David L. Phillips, Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco (Westview
Press, 2005); Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory (New York: Henry Holt, 2005).
9. James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider’s View
of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007),
page 36.
10. Richard Scott Moore, “Non-Traditional Missions, Civil
Tasks, Military Forces, and Complex Operations,” in Jon Gundersen and Melanne Civic, Unity of Mission, Air University Press
(2014).
11. Rebecca Patterson, Revisiting a School of Military Government:
How Reanimating a WWII-Era Institution Could Professionalize Military Nation Building. Kauffman Foundation Research Series: Expeditionary Economics (June 2011) http:ry //www.entrepreneurship.
org/~/media/Entrepreneurship/Files/Resource%20Ceonter/EE%20
Revisiting%20reportfinal_withphotos.pdf.
12. 38Gs will not be limited to providing administration in
occupation/liberation situations. They may also engage in developmental advise and support activities as part of other types of
missions not involving combat operations or occupation. But if
the US has the qualified personnel and other resources needed
for occupation, these assets can be used for other missions such
as security assistance, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping
when required.
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