Notes
1. Erwin F. Ziemke, The US Army in the Occupation of Germany
1944-1946 (Army Historical Series), (Washington, DC: US Army
Center of Military History, 2003 reprint), page 3.
2. Erwin L. Hunt et al., American Military Government of Occupied Germany 1918-1920 (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1943) (the “Hunt Report”).
3. Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (United States Army in World War II, Special Studies), (Washington, DC: Office of The Chief of Military
History, Department of the Army, 1964).
4. DOD Directive 2000.13, Subject: Civil Affairs (March 11,
2014), Para. 3(5). It should be noted that this requirement to be
able to execute military government is not included in TRADOC
Pam 525-8-5, US Army Functional Concept for Engagement (24 Feb
2014), and needs to be added to that pamphlet.
5. FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations (2011, with changes 1 and
2, 2014), para. 2-59.
6. The scope of this paper has been very deliberately limited
to what the US military can do in an occupation or liberation scenario, rather than propose an inter-agency solution. While other
agencies of the US government will also participate in any occupation or liberation action, the capability and capacity of other agencies to participate in the early stages of an occupation or liberation
will be quite limited; the other agencies, by their structures, mandates, staffing, and funding, are and will be very limited in their
ability to plan and execute any operations to administer occupied
or liberated territory. The optimum solution would be some sort
of inter-agency process or organizational structure that was designed to function in an occupation or liberation administration;
however, there is no such process or structure that exists today,
nor does there appear that a viable system will be developed in
the foreseeable future.
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