Bulk Distributor Nov/Dec 18

B ULK D ISTRIBUTOR www.bulk-distributor.com November/December 2018 Est. 1990 Your single information source for bulk and semi-bulk logistics Tank Containers • Flexitanks • IBCs • Drums • FIBCs • Bulk Liners • Road Tankers • Loading/Bagging • Bulk Logistics • Cleaning & Repair Depots • Components IN THIS ISSUE Shipper 2 Sector Focus: Chemicals 3 Intermodal 5 Tank Containers 7 Cleaning 9 Asset Management 10 Industrial Packaging 14 Logistics 17 Industrial Packaging 15 Ports & Storage 19 Maersk says the Honam clearly showed that international regulations and practices for dangerous goods stowage need to be reviewed FEATURES IN THE NEXT ISSUE Tank Containers Components Asset Management To advertise or contribute please email anne@bulk-distributor.com or newsdesk@bulk-distributor.com Maersk unveils new DG guidelines T he world’s biggest container carrier, Maersk Line, has completed the implementation of new guidelines on dangerous goods stowage. After a thorough review of current safety practices and policies in the stowage of dangerous cargo, Maersk drew up the guidelines in the wake of a fire aboard the Maersk Honam in March this year which claimed the lives of five crew members. Maersk evaluated over 3,000 United Nations (UN) numbers of hazardous materials in order to understand further and improve dangerous cargo stowage on-board container vessels and developed a new set of principles called Risk Based Dangerous Goods Stowage (RBDGS). Together with the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), Maersk called for a workshop with other industry stakeholders to conduct a comprehensive Hazard Identification study that validated these new guidelines which have now been implemented across the carrier’s fleet of more than 750 vessels. The RBDGS principles have also been presented to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as well as the Danish Maritime Authorities. “All cargo aboard Maersk Honam was accepted as per the requirements of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code and stowed on- board the vessel accordingly. Despite this, as the fire originated in a cargo hold in front of the accommodation which held several containers with dangerous goods, it had an unbearably tragic outcome,” said Ole Graa Jakobsen, head of fleet technology at Maersk. “This clearly showed us that the international regulations and practices with regards to dangerous goods stowage need to be reviewed in order to protect crew, cargo, environment and vessels.” The RBDGS principles have been developed with the aim of minimising risk to crew, cargo, environment and vessel in case a fire develops. Different container vessel designs were reviewed from a risk mitigation perspective and ultimately six different risk zones defined. Cargo covered under the IMDG Code will no longer be stowed next to accommodation and main propulsion plant which is defined as the zone with the lowest risk tolerance. Similarly, risk tolerance will be low below deck and in the middle of the vessel, whereas the risk tolerance will be higher on deck fore and aft. Using statistics on container fires in the Cargo Incident Notification System (CINS), Maersk defined which UN numbers can be stored in each risk zone. The carrier will continue to review its rules and policies for accepting dangerous goods and assess how to improve them further. Together with other CINS members, Maersk is looking to channel these experiences into developing new industry best practices. “Container ship fires are a problem for our entire industry and we intend to share and discuss our learnings from this thorough review within relevant industry forums. We very much believe that discussions, views and insights among container carriers can further improve fire safety in our industry,” said Jakobsen. “We aim for long term improvements by reviewing our systems and then designing an end-to-end process that is safe for our seafarers and smooth for our customers.” In the coming months, a review aimed at creating best management practices for dangerous goods stowage will be undertaken with participation from ABS, Lloyds Register, the International Group of P&I Clubs, National Cargo Bureau, the TT Club and Exis Technologies. Once the project is completed the best management practices will be published and presented to the IMO. On Tuesday 6 March, the Maersk Honam reported a serious fire. The crew managed to release the vessels’ CO2 system into the cargo hold. Regrettably that did not stop the fire. Maersk Honam was carrying dangerous goods in the cargo hold where the fire originated, however there as yet is no evidence to suggest that dangerous goods caused the fire. Five crew members lost their lives in course of the incident. Maersk is still awaiting the investigation to establish the root cause of the fire in the cargo hold. Stolt mulls Flaminia ruling In another development Stolt-Nielsen and its division Stolt Tank Containers said they were disappointed by a court ruling in America which assigned responsibility for losses caused by an explosion and fire on the containership MSC Flaminia to Stolt Tank Containers and Deltech Corporation. The accident, which claimed the lives of three crew members, occurred in July 2012. On 10 September, the Southern District Of New York Court ruled that Daltech, the manufacturer of the chemical - 80 percent grade divinylbenze (DVB80) – that autopolymerised, and eventually led to the explosion on board the ship, was declared 55 percent responsible for the losses stemming from the incident. The remaining 45 percent of losses were assigned to Stolt, which the judge ruled had “failed to pass information to the ocean carrier, MSC, (on the heat sensitive nature of the DVB) in an effective manner regarding the dangers of heat exposure to the particular cargo”. The judge also ruled that Stolt was responsible for arranging loading the DVB into ISO tank containers earlier than it should have, and arranging for those to be transported to New Orleans Terminal (NOT – the point of lading) and deposited them in the open air at the terminal, “even though it had a reasonable basis to anticipate that the tanks would sit stagnant for a number of days”. In a statement Stolt and Deltech claimed that the general knowledge MSC possessed regarding DVB’s heat sensitive nature mitigated “Stolt’s responsibility to effectively warn MSC about known dangers for these particular ISO containers”. But the court deemed this not to be the case. “We were disappointed and disagree with the ruling that found fault for the casualty rested solely with our customer, Deltech, and us, Stolt Tank Containers, in our capacity as the shipper of record of the subject cargo of dangerous goods,” the company said in a comment on the ruling. “We are continuing to work together with our lawyers and underwriters on this matter and as the lawsuit is ongoing we are unable to comment further at this time.” Finding against Deltech, the judge said that, contrary to the company’s own safety protocols developed after prior polymerisation incidents which determined that shipping DVB out of New Orleans should be avoided in warmer months, Deltech booked the shipment of DVB80 out of New Orleans for late June. “This fateful decision was the result of – at the very least – a combination of a considered decision at the highest levels of Deltech and managerial errors that followed.” Continued on page 8 ї