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November/December 2018
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Maersk says the Honam clearly showed
that international regulations and
practices for dangerous goods stowage
need to be reviewed
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Maersk unveils new DG guidelines
T
he world’s biggest container carrier,
Maersk Line, has completed the
implementation of new guidelines on
dangerous goods stowage.
After a thorough review of current safety
practices and policies in the stowage of dangerous
cargo, Maersk drew up the guidelines in the wake
of a fire aboard the Maersk Honam in March this
year which claimed the lives of five crew members.
Maersk evaluated over 3,000 United Nations (UN)
numbers of hazardous materials in order to
understand further and improve dangerous cargo
stowage on-board container vessels and developed
a new set of principles called Risk Based Dangerous
Goods Stowage (RBDGS).
Together with the American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS), Maersk called for a workshop with other
industry stakeholders to conduct a comprehensive
Hazard Identification study that validated these
new guidelines which have now been implemented
across the carrier’s fleet of more than 750 vessels.
The RBDGS principles have also been presented
to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as
well as the Danish Maritime Authorities.
“All cargo aboard Maersk Honam was accepted
as per the requirements of the International
Maritime Dangerous Goods Code and stowed on-
board the vessel accordingly. Despite this, as the
fire originated in a cargo hold in front of the
accommodation which held several containers with
dangerous goods, it had an unbearably tragic
outcome,” said Ole Graa Jakobsen, head of fleet
technology at Maersk.
“This clearly showed us that the international
regulations and practices with regards to
dangerous goods stowage need to be reviewed in
order to protect crew, cargo, environment and
vessels.”
The RBDGS principles have been developed with
the aim of minimising risk to crew, cargo,
environment and vessel in case a fire develops.
Different container vessel designs were reviewed
from a risk mitigation perspective and ultimately six
different risk zones defined.
Cargo covered under the IMDG Code will no
longer be stowed next to accommodation and
main propulsion plant which is defined as the zone
with the lowest risk tolerance. Similarly, risk
tolerance will be low below deck and in the middle
of the vessel, whereas the risk tolerance will be
higher on deck fore and aft. Using statistics on
container fires in the Cargo Incident Notification
System (CINS), Maersk defined which UN numbers
can be stored in each risk zone.
The carrier will continue to review its rules and
policies for accepting dangerous goods and assess
how to improve them further. Together with other
CINS members, Maersk is looking to channel these
experiences into developing new industry best
practices.
“Container ship fires are a problem for our entire
industry and we intend to share and discuss our
learnings from this thorough review within relevant
industry forums. We very much believe that
discussions, views and insights among container
carriers can further improve fire safety in our
industry,” said Jakobsen. “We aim for long term
improvements by reviewing our systems and then
designing an end-to-end process that is safe for
our seafarers and smooth for our customers.”
In the coming months, a review aimed at creating
best management practices for dangerous goods
stowage will be undertaken with participation from
ABS, Lloyds Register, the International Group of P&I
Clubs, National Cargo Bureau, the TT Club and Exis
Technologies.
Once the project is completed the best
management practices will be published and
presented to the IMO.
On Tuesday 6 March, the Maersk Honam
reported a serious fire. The crew managed to
release the vessels’ CO2 system into the cargo
hold. Regrettably that did not stop the fire. Maersk
Honam was carrying dangerous goods in the cargo
hold where the fire originated, however there as
yet is no evidence to suggest that dangerous goods
caused the fire.
Five crew members lost their lives in course of the
incident. Maersk is still awaiting the investigation to
establish the root cause of the fire in the cargo
hold.
Stolt mulls Flaminia ruling
In another development Stolt-Nielsen and its
division Stolt Tank Containers said they were
disappointed by a court ruling in America which
assigned responsibility for losses caused by an
explosion and fire on the containership MSC
Flaminia to Stolt Tank Containers and Deltech
Corporation.
The accident, which claimed the lives of three
crew members, occurred in July 2012.
On 10 September, the Southern District Of New
York Court ruled that Daltech, the manufacturer of
the chemical - 80 percent grade divinylbenze
(DVB80) – that autopolymerised, and eventually led
to the explosion on board the ship, was declared
55 percent responsible for the losses stemming
from the incident.
The remaining 45 percent of losses were assigned
to Stolt, which the judge ruled had “failed to pass
information to the ocean carrier, MSC, (on the heat
sensitive nature of the DVB) in an effective manner
regarding the dangers of heat exposure to the
particular cargo”.
The judge also ruled that Stolt was responsible
for arranging loading the DVB into ISO tank
containers earlier than it should have, and
arranging for those to be transported to New
Orleans Terminal (NOT – the point of lading) and
deposited them in the open air at the terminal,
“even though it had a reasonable basis to
anticipate that the tanks would sit stagnant for a
number of days”.
In a statement Stolt and Deltech claimed that the
general knowledge MSC possessed regarding
DVB’s heat sensitive nature mitigated “Stolt’s
responsibility to effectively warn MSC about known
dangers for these particular ISO containers”. But
the court deemed this not to be the case.
“We were disappointed and disagree with the
ruling that found fault for the casualty rested
solely with our customer, Deltech, and us, Stolt
Tank Containers, in our capacity as the shipper of
record of the subject cargo of dangerous goods,”
the company said in a comment on the ruling.
“We are continuing to work together with our
lawyers and underwriters on this matter and as the
lawsuit is ongoing we are unable to comment
further at this time.”
Finding against Deltech, the judge said that,
contrary to the company’s own safety protocols
developed after prior polymerisation incidents
which determined that shipping DVB out of New
Orleans should be avoided in warmer months,
Deltech booked the shipment of DVB80 out of
New Orleans for late June.
“This fateful decision was the result of – at the
very least – a combination of a considered decision
at the highest levels of Deltech and managerial
errors that followed.”
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