for example, crop research—but always in collaboration with
nationals, working in national institutions. Talented and
committed national staff would have strong incentives to work
with the expatriate personnel, including in-service training
and the opportunity for advanced study in the United States.
The goal is that, within a few years, the national staff would
be able to run viable, self-sustaining national institutions
without outside advice.
Frequently, U.S. contractors and NGOs object that
national institutions lack trained and committed staff and
have problems with corruption. But it’s part of the job to lead
by example and to provide technical assistance and incentives
for higher productivity. USAID did this successfully in Asia
from the late 1950s to the 1970s. The United States played a
key role in the agricultural universities of India,5 Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Taiwan,6 and
in turn, those universities all played a major role in their
countries’ accelerated agricultural growth and the associated
dramatic decline in poverty rates—by 30 to 40 percent.
Although there was corruption in these countries, USAID
contracting systems were largely able to prevent corruption
in these universities, and technical assistance improved their
efficiency. Ethiopia as an early recipient of U.S. aid received
similar help. Despite the premature cessation of that aid,
some gains remain; they are the basis for an optimistic view
of Ethiopia’s current focus on revitalizing its agriculture.
Helping national institutions to provide services is
also critical to strengthening democratic governments.
When foreigners are perceived as providing the services,
it is foreigners who get credit, often at the expense of the
government. Rather than complementing or guiding the
efforts of governments, the “outsiders helping” approach
undermines or weakens national institutions.
300. The agricultural college at Kabul University needs
several professors with Ph.D. degrees in each of a dozen
essential departments. (There has been a modest but very
important program for sending staff to Bangalore, India, to
earn master’s degrees). The Ministry of Agriculture needs
several highly trained people in each of about a dozen
specialties, such as health inspection and phyto-sanitary
requirements for exports. Many of the same experts are also
needed in the private sector, adding to the shortages. When
these needs are multiplied by all low-income countries,
the trained specialist shortage is measured in the tens of
thousands—thousands need to be trained every year. The
past 20 years of neglect of such training comes at a huge cost
in present-day effectiveness.
Development requires nurturing public institutions that
are staffed by educated people. Post-graduate education is
more and more essential. At one time, the United States
trained large numbers of Asian professionals; this had a major
impact, not only in developing critical institutions that fueled
the Green Revolution, but in building understanding of U.S.
institutions and easing the way for complex negotiations on
mutual interests.
Africa has benefited little from such training. The
most important cause of the poor performance of African
agriculture is the failure to train people for this critical work.
There has also been little training for the few remaining
low-income countries in Asia. In the past eight years in
Afghanistan, there has been hardly a trace of advanced
training. The Afghan extension service used to have more
than 3,000 trained agriculturalists. It is now down to only
6 Briefing Paper, November 2009
USAID
Long-Term Training of Nationals
Ch. Damba, an agronomist, is teaching Mongolians how to plant
vegetables. Damba received an Entrepeneur Award from the
USAID-funded Training, Advocacy and Network Project.
Re-staffing of USAID Technical Competence
Development, especially in agriculture, is a technical
process and requires technically competent personnel.
USAID itself needs to invest in technically competent
staff, not only in the area of agriculture but in every sector.
This will mean developing a comprehensive strategy for
re-staffing, setting priorities, and identifying the skills and
expertise that are needed. Once hired, an agricultural expert
cannot be transformed into a democracy expert.