Briefing Papers Number 8, November 2009 | Page 2

T he world now has an estimated one billion hungry people—more than 100 million more than in 2007. The primary reason? The global demand for food has increased more rapidly than the supply, driving up prices rapidly. Even in the midst of a global recession, food prices have not fallen far from their 2008 peaks. Since the world’s poorest people spend 70 to 80 percent of their incomes on food, they are forced to buy less when prices rise. There is nothing else in the household budget to cut. The simple truth is that when there is an inadequate global supply of food, it is poor people who must eat less. U.S. foreign aid in general, and USAID programs in particular, have lost focus in four key areas: 1. A shift away from projects and programs aimed at national impact to small, self-contained projects that are much less ambitious in scope. 2. A shift away from efforts to build national institutions, particularly the public institutions that are essential to self-sustaining progress towards a country’s development objectives. 3. An underestimation of the role of technical expertise in development efforts today. 4. The de-emphasis of broad-based economic growth in favor of social sector interventions—including the virtual elimination of support for agriculture. Todd Post For low-income countries, the key to achieving any other development objective is long-term, self-sustaining growth that includes rapid reductions in food insecurity and poverty. This paper focuses on assistance to these countries. The importance of agriculture stems from the reality that, in low-income countries, anywhere from 60 to 90 percent of the population lives in rural areas and is dependent on agriculture—directly or indirectly—for nearly all income. Many grain producers in Ethiopia bring their crops to the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange in Addis Ababa for traders and individuals to purchase. Today’s hunger crisis is a failure of agricultural production. Shortcomings in foreign assistance have played a role in the problem; thus, foreign assistance reform must play a key role in the solution. The foreign assistance reforms that are needed are extensive: a complete restructuring of what is now a largely uncoordinated foreign aid effort spread over many agencies, combined with a redefinition of U.S. short-term and long-term objectives for development and foreign policy. However, if foreign assistance is to be successful in assuring food security, poverty reduction, women’s participation, and sustainable growth that will eventually enable countries to function without foreign aid, there must also be fundamental changes in its operational priorities and delivery systems. This paper addresses these essential first steps in effective foreign assistance reform. 2  Briefing Paper, November 2009 1. A shift away from projects and programs aimed at national impact to small, self-contained projects that are much less ambitious in scope. Smaller projects lend themselves to easy-to-measure quantitative “results”—the nu mber of people vaccinated, the number of children enrolled in school—and are often carried out in historically underserved areas. The problem arises when these projects are undertaken outside a larger strategic context and without rigorous economic analysis. Economic analysis is necessary to determine the relative costs and benefits of a project, particularly the opportunity costs (what else could have been done with the funding instead?) and to what degree the practice of investing in a variety of separate projects will contribute to the country’s broader agenda for growth and poverty alleviation.2 A further complication, as noted in a 2006 DAC peer review3, is created by the fragmentation of development funding and responsibilities among numerous donor government departments and agencies. Each pursues its own set of small interventions without reference to host country priorities or an overarching development strategy. The result of all this is no overall impact on national development objectives. 2. A shift away from efforts to build national institutions, particularly the public institutions that are essential to selfsustaining progress towards a country’s objectives. This shift hit agriculture particularly hard, because small farmers depend