Arts & International Affairs: Volume 3, Issue 1, Spring 2018 - Page 78

ARTS & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The paper starts by considering Wittgenstein’s account of difference, whether people can have different values, and whether they have a common vocabulary to discuss these values. The paper then considers the implications of this plurality, and of the potential for relativism to, in effect, destroy any possibility of making valid judgments about the values of others. It concludes by returning to Wittgenstein’s view that we can live our lives neither without our values, nor without understanding that our values are relative to those of others. Differences Wittgenstein argues that people exist and acquire meaning through their participation in different “Forms of Life.” 1 He intended both a singular and a plural use of the concept, with “a single human form of life characterised by innumerable forms of human life” (Moy- al-Sharrock 2015:21). The concept pre-dates Wittgenstein, and it was not central to his work, but it can indicate a way of living (a culture) (see H