Arts & International Affairs: Volume 2, Issue 1 | Page 121

����:��). They soon also confronted serious economic challenges. Formerly
home to thriving iron and steel mills, as well as mining, shipbuilding and
a busy port, the region was undergoing deindustrialization by the mid-
����s. “The metropolitan area had lost ��% of its population and ��% of its
industrial jobs in the two preceding decades” (Fraser ����:��).
Economic woes were compounded by skittish investors who hesitated to put
their money in a region known for Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) terrorist
activity (Haacke ����:���). At the same time, the region was aware of the
need to find a meaningful identity within the growing European Union.
These considerations led to a modernization and economic revitalization
strategy to evolve from an industrial to a services city (Azua ����:��). This
plan presumed job creation, economic modernization, infrastructure
development, increased tourism, and stimulus for local firms. Bilbao was the
centerpiece of the regional strategy, which included a substantial cultural
component.
Under the terms of the deal between the Basque Autonomous Government
and the Guggenheim Museum, Krens asked for $�� million up front for the
use of the Guggenheim name (Zulaika calls this the “franchise fee” (Zulaika
����:���)); a commitment of an additional $��� million toward construction
costs; $�� million for an art acquisition program; and an ongoing subsidy
of $� million per year for operating costs and maintenance (MacCannell
����:��; see also Haacke ����). More money would be forthcoming for
acquisitions in later years (Haacke ����:���). In return, the Guggenheim
would offer its brand name, works from its collection, and travelling
exhibitions. The Guggenheim retained complete control over programming,
operations, and acquisitions. Bilbao would be the first experiment with a
new strategy. “The Guggenheim’s primary assets were its collection and its
image…. instead of selling works from its collection, the museum hit on
the idea of renting them—to itself. Branch museums financed by foreign
governments and corporations, but directed entirely by management in
New York, would pay the Guggenheim for the privilege of presenting its
exhibitions and collections” (Fraser ����:��).
Obviously, this was a huge risk on the part of the regional ministry of culture.
It has paid off in many ways. “Immediately, the image of the Guggenheim
became the international icon, displacing the ETA terrorist as the prime
symbol of the region” (MacCannell ����:��). From the first year, more than
a million people have visited the museum annually, the vast majority from
outside of Spain (MacCannell ����:��). The Guggenheim Bilbao stimulated
the Bilbao economy by bringing tourists and creating a need for cognate
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