READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
disagreement on operational priorities
that were not resolved even during the
campaign itself.
The lack of a joint headquarters also
resulted in significant issues during the
execution of the Sicilian Campaign.
The most tragic incident occurred on
D+2 when the 504th Parachute Infantry
Regiment was due to reinforce the
1st (US) Infantry Division. The route
taken by aircraft involved in this hastily
arranged parachute drop was directly
over the beachheads and took place
only 30 minutes after a German air raid.
Although some gun sites and ships had
received details of the flight path, others
had not. Therefore as soon as the lead
C-47s arrived over the beachheads they
were subject to anti-aircraft fire. Of the
147 planes involved, 23 were shot down
with a further 37 severely damaged.
Battle Rhythm agility
Lesson Identified: The battle rhythm(s)
(BR) for planning and execution need
to be agile. The BR must enable
planning at different speeds, e.g. SOF
vs conventional forces. It must also be
able to execute at different speeds, e.g.
to contest the initiative.
In addition to the earlier example where
information of the 504th Parachute
Infantry Regiment’s route was not
provided to the maritime component
and the anti-aircraft batteries at the
beachhead, the importance of an agile
BR was highlighted by the lack of
amphibious operations in support of
the final advances towards Messina.
Throughout the campaign there were
opportunities for significant operational
gains from amphibious operations.
However, these were only attempted in
any scale later in the campaign as both
the US 7th and British 8th Armies closed
in on Messina. By this point a combination
of the rapidity of the advance and the
lethargy of the planning ensured that the
four amphibious operations provided little
tactical and no operational advantage.
The success of the Axis’ delaying
operations,
which
enabled
the
evacuation of troops and materiel across
the Straits of Messina, stood in stark
contrast to the Allied effort to prevent it.
In total over 100,000 Axis troops and all
their associated vehicles and equipment
were transported back to the mainland.
The Allies never mounted a concerted
maritime, air or joint interdiction
operation. The German review of the
campaign sought to understand why the
Allies had not tried to block the straits
or to exploit the options for amphibious
operations and why they had persisted
with slow moving frontal attacks.
Figure 2 - Amphibious operations during the advance to Messina.
Governance of occupied
territories
Conclusion
Lesson Identified: Ensuring that the
culture and mind-set of the forces within
theatre is appropriate for the legal
basis under which we operate. This will
differ depending on status of territory,
re-occupation of NATO territory or
occupation of non-NATO territory.
The occupation of Sicily was the first
time that the Allies had occupied part
of an Axis country. The campaigns in
the Far East and North Africa had seen
liberation of Axis-held Allied colonial
territories or occupation of Axis colonial
territories. To ensure that the occupation
was a success they established the
Allied Military Government of Occupied
Territory (AMGOT) under the direct
control of Gen. Alexander. The AMGOT
had six branches (legal, financial, civilian
supply, public health, public safety and
enemy property) and five objectives:
1. Security for occupying forces and the
lines of communications.
2. Restore
law, order and
conditions for the population.
normal
3. Relieve combat troops from providing
civil administration.
4. Resource occupying forces from the
local economy.
5. Promote Allies’ political and military
objectives.
The success of AMGOT prevented the
occupying troops from suffering the same
fate as the French had in Spain during
the Peninsular War or the Germans
during Operation BARBAROSSA. It also
provided a template that could be used
for the remainder of operations in Italy
and Germany.
The Sicilian Campaign provides an
excellent opportunity to study the
challenges of planning and executing
a large-scale joint campaign as well as
the post-conflict reconstruction of an
occupied territory. This essay has sought
to highlight how the historical lessons
of Operation HUSKY can be used to
inform a contemporary NATO JTF
headquarters. It has focussed only on
the key lessons identified from AC18 as it
was not possible to cover all the lessons.
Although AC18 studied Operation
HUSKY from a JTF perspective, many
of the lessons identified are equally as
applicable as the ARRC returns to corps
recalibration.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Major James Grant is an 11-year
veteran of the British Army and currently
serves in the ARRC’s Engineering
Logistics and Infrastructure cell. In his
previous assignment he completed the
Intermediate Command and Staff Course
(Land) at the Defence Academy of the
United Kingdom. Maj. Grant has led
military engineering operations as part
of counter-IED and security operations in
Afghanistan and during the 2012 London
Olympics. A native of London, England,
Maj. Grant holds a Master’s Degree
in Mechanical Engineering from the
University of Bristol.
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
83