ARRC JOURNAL
Figure 1 – Operation HUSKY, D-Day concept.
The campaign was studied from an Allied
and Axis perspective, reflecting on the
strengths and weaknesses of both sides
and drawing lessons for a contemporary
JTF headquarters. This essay will
provide historical background to three of
the key lessons identified.
1. The importance of a JTF headquarters
to ensure unity of purpose and
coherence of operational priorities.
2. Battle rhythm agility.
3. Governance in occupied territories.
It does not include an overall campaign
overview as this is covered in Maj. Cox’s
excellent piece that complements this.
This article also does not cover all of the
lessons identified during the exercise,
but these are available from the Exercise
ARRCADE CAESAR public WiP and the
ARRC lessons identified portal (for those
posted to the ARRC), or by contacting
the author.
The importance of a JTF HQ
to ensure unity of purpose
and coherence of operational
priorities
Whilst the other two sections in this essay
detail the background to standalone
lessons identified, this paragraph is an
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ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
amalgam of several individual lessons.
Lesson Identified: Understanding
and explaining campaign objectives.
Clarity in the definition and understanding
of campaign objectives and supporting
effects is vital. This clarity should also
enable the right level of collaboration
from the components.
Lesson Identified: Components. As
well as the standard five components
(MCC, LCC, ACC, SOF and JLSG),
other areas, such as cyber and CEMA,
were discussed in a “component-like”
manner. Absolute clarity and shared
understanding of the commander’s
intent, main effort and end state at the
operational level also help to generate
collaboration amongst components.
Lesson Identified: Influencing the
planning process of Multinational
Detailed Deployment Plans (MNDPP).
The ARRC will need to influence the
MNDDP to ensure that the plan delivers
the right forces and support at the right
time.
The strategic direction for Operation
HUSKY was the result of the Casablanca
conference (14-24 January 1943), which
was attended by Prime Minister Churchill
and President Roosevelt and their
respective military staffs. Following the
conference, the Conduct of War in 1943
memorandum, dated 19 January 1943,
recommended the occupation of Sicily
with the objectives of:
• Making
the Mediterranean line of
communication more secure
• Diverting German pressure from the
Russian front
• Intensifying the pressure on Italy
At the time the accepted convention was
for British ‘joint’ planning to be conducted
by a committee of peers across the
three services. Although Gen. Alexander
was the deputy commander under the
supreme commander, Gen. Eisenhower,
the planning had to be agreed to by
Alexander in Algiers, Adm. Cunningham
in Malta and Air Marshal Tedder in Tunis.
However, until May 1943 their focus
was on the successful completion of
the North African Campaign. Therefore
operational planning was left to a
relatively junior team of planners led by
Maj. Gen. Gairdner, based in Algiers.
The geographical dislocation of the
component headquarters and lack of a
joint headquarters to coordinate planning
resulted in significant changes by the
various commanders and widespread