ARRC Journal 2019 | Page 80

ARRC JOURNAL which was exploited by the Luftwaffe, as was the lack of tactical air support to the land component in the close battle. It also led to one of the great tragedies of the operation when a lack of coordination and battlespace deconfliction caused the invasion fleet to mistakenly fire en masse at the formations of transport aircraft that carried the airborne contingent, leading to serious losses of soldiers, pilots and aircraft. It will be up to the JTF to ensure that the efforts of the component commands are pulling in the same direction, ensuring that their actions are properly deconflicted and are mutually supporting both in the planning and execution phases. The Allies also failed to engage their Axis opponents in the deep battlespace. Due to the detachment of AFHQ from the operational area, and the land dominance of the headquarters in Sicily, Operation HUSKY demanded a previously unprecedented level of Inter-Component cooperation. These include the importance of unifying component command planning; ensuring the land component does not dominate the planning process to the detriment of the campaign; ensuring a common battlespace Operation HUSKY featured some novel and unpractised modes of Inter- picture across Component warfare with mixed success. This US Waco Glider was one of the component many that did not make landfall; a victim of inter-component and operator inexperience. commands; and, finally, making sure too great an emphasis was put on the that there is an appreciation of the close, close land battle to achieve the decisive deep and rear battle across the force. The effect. Throughout the operation, the lessons the Allies learned in Sicily were air components of both the UK and later put to good use when the campaign US maintained a focus on strategic continued onto the Italian mainland and bombing of the Axis heartlands. Neither when subsequent amphibious invasions country sufficiently resourced efforts to understand the Axis rear area and conduct deep offensive operations. This allowed Axis forces breathing room to manage their battlespace and components better, conducting an organised withdrawal to a succession of strong positions in the close battle whilst preparing their rear area for evacuation. Ultimately, they managed to evacuate 53,545 soldiers, 50 tanks, 9,185 vehicles and almost 12,000 tonnes of stores over the Straits of Messina to fight again with virtually no Allied effort made to interdict them. The JTF role demands that the headquarters possess a full appreciation of the whole battle – close, deep and rear – and coordinate the efforts in each to achieve a decisive effect. To conclude, this essay touched on the salient lessons that a NATO HRF(L) can learn about the conduct of the JTF role from the 1943 Sicily Campaign. 80 ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS were conducted in Normandy and the South of France in 1944. All of these were much more successful Joint Allied actions in comparison. A prospective NATO JTF should heed these valuable lessons from history. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Major Andy Cox is a 17-year veteran of the British Army and currently serves as the ARRC’s Movements Planning Officer. In his previous assignment he served as a Squadron Commander at the British Army’s Defence School of Transport in Leconfield, England. Maj. Cox has led combat logistics operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A native of Wolverhampton, England, Maj. Cox holds a Master’s Degree in Military History from the University of Birmingham. A map of the final stage of the campaign. The Axis forces were able to stage an orderly withdrawal from Sicily, aided partially by the Allied lack of appreciation for Inter-Component Deep Offensive Operations.