ARRC JOURNAL
with options and a roadmap was agreed
to enable us to ‘Survive to Command’;
this was to be a sequential process
with a focus on the Command (Forward
(FWD)), then Control (MAIN) over the
next four years. would be impossible without prohibitive
equipment acquisition and our signature,
by any recognisable metric, would be
immediately identifiable. A new approach
was needed without bending the laws of
physics or sticking our heads in the sand.
‘Survive to Command’ accepted MAIN’s
inability to deploy outside of TBM(P)
and aimed to create a command
post (CP), which could provide the
ARRC commander with a physical
and sustainable presence in the area
of responsibility (AOR). The guiding
principles for ‘Survive to Command’
were: 3 The corps study period (CSP) saw the
C2WG return to the problem. Lessons
from Exercise ARRCADE Fusion 2017
(FWD and CJOC), and the 3rd (UK)
Division’s Exercise IRON RESOLVE
2017 among others, had pointed
towards the use of ‘integrated cells’
as a way of maximising staff effort and
resolving complexity on the modern
battlefield. Indeed, our own doctrine
relies upon the integration of staff on the
basis of planning horizons as shown in
Army Field Manual (AFM) Command
(Figure 1).
a. Make maximum use of distributed
command in an agile, small CP that
supports decision making. 4
b.
Unconstrained
headquarters models.
by
current
Encouraged by this, the C2WG
conducted some introspection. In the
ARRC the staff come together and
integrate during battle rhythm events,
returning to their branches to conduct
day-to-day business. The doctrine and
emerging battle management systems
(a CIS cocktail of C2, SA, BSM) gave
us a thought: What if we turned this
on its head? What if we permanently
established as integrated cells? Would
the CIS allow us to communicate with
our branches? Many briefs were already
being carried out on the network. Surely
it was possible. Our thoughts were
echoed by the UK’s Joint Concept Note
on Future Command and Control (JCN
2/17, Sep 17).
“Structures in our current operational
headquarters are, often stove-piped,
c. Minimise electronic and physical
signatures. Hide with a low-profile
deployment.
d. Use a building of opportunity (BOO)
and move to enhance survivability.
The result was a small FWD CP, which
was to be austere and reduced in manning
to the point of discomfort. After some
preliminary testing and many questions
about its validity, FWD was deployed
on Exercise ARRCADE FUSION 2017.
With
experimental
communications
techniques and equipment, the CP was
able to move regularly and provide the
ARRC’s commander with the situational
awareness (SA) he required. A healthy
appetite for risk, acceptance of failure,
trust and delegated authorities were
all essential to the success of this
experiment.
Attention now turned to MAIN. The
ARRC’s commander (via Chief G3)
directed the C2 working group (C2WG) to
use, where applicable, the assumptions,
lessons and principles of the FWD CP
to address the vulnerabilities of MAIN.
There was one key change: MAIN would
no longer be under TBM(P). This project
inevitably became known as ‘Survive to
Control’.
In early 2018 those brave enough
attended the Exercise ARRCADE
THOR C2 sub-group. The question
posed was, “During corps warfighting,
what is the minimum number of staff
the ARRC needs in the AOR in order
to maintain MAIN’s functionality?” The
extant figure was too large, mobility
Figure 1 – Synchronising Functional Branches across Integrating Cells
Functional Cells. The staff branches …
should be organised into Functional Cells
based upon the ‘Tactical Functions’.
Integrating Cells. Each of the Functional
Cells provides staff to the Integrating
Cells during the Operations Process.
CP Considerations for the Integrating
Cells. A CP should be organised into
Integrated Cells. The integration is
based on the traditional G staff as well
as specialist capabilities.
Army Field Manual (AFM) Command.
May 2017
J1 - J9 staff branches. These structures
are maintained for ease of cooperation
with similarly organised staff branches
in other operational headquarters,
rather than for addressing the full
breadth of full spectrum activity and
associated missions and tasks. This
may be addressed with a structure that
is more outcome focused 5 , rather than
functionally organised. Breaking out of
the J1-J9 structure will be challenging”.
“Alternatives to J1-J9 structures, may
bring about greater benefits in managing
complex interrelated and dynamic
problems. Different options should be
considered including the decentralisation
of decision-making where appropriate,
3 Situational Awareness and SME knowledge, from which the commander could take 3-star decisions, as well as longevity.
4 Draft UK AFM 3: Command dated 2017. Distributed command is broadly the deployment of bespoke functionality to one location whilst using reach back/ reach forward communications to
the non-deployed Main CP. Dispersed command sees the HQ staff deployed forward by functional grouping but not centrally located.
5 The Standing Joint Forces Headquarters structure based on understand, design, operate and enable offers one alternative model.
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