ARRC JOURNAL
The UK has delivered a number of
Short Term Training Teams (STTT) to
support the Uganda People’s Defence
Force (UPDF) in their brigade planning
processes. Early STTTs saw brigade
headquarters with a single laptop to
create Operational Staff Work (OSW).
However, this did not prevent them from
planning, publishing OSW and deploying
the whole brigade to Southern Sudan in
48 hours using nothing more than maps,
notebooks and two mobile phones.
Later STTTs were struck by the decline
in attention to detail and tempo as the
technological footprint of the brigade
grew; ‘cut and paste’ OSW became the
norm to the detriment of the output of
the headquarters. While the bare bones
model may not be something that the
ARRC should seek to replicate, it does
show that technology is not as essential
as we like to think it is.
Physical
Requirements.
Once
unnecessary functions and processes
have been removed, and what remains
has been optimised, the physical
requirements of the headquarters can
be addressed. While concurrent and
collaborative working adds considerable
value, there is an opportunity to
reduce the number of laptops in the
headquarters. In teams where such work
is not essential, this could be as simple
as having only two computers; one for
the team lead and one for a scribe. The
remainder of the team is released to focus
on adding value and supporting output,
creating an associated saving in desks
and tent-space. Additionally, questioning
the comfortable nature of the fixed base
model could bring substantial reductions.
For example, not all personnel need to
have a hot shower every day. There
is nothing preventing the provision of
hot water for personal hygiene, with a
showering facility held in the rear area to
be brought forward on a regular basis or
rotated through as individuals require. A
fully established cookhouse and dining
facility is similarly not necessary. The
Danish and German contingents have
deployable field kitchens that operate
from an intermodal container (ISO) or
trailer that can support a company-
sized element, with individuals finding
their own space to eat. Looking at the
physical footprint of the headquarters,
the use of large ‘Rubb’ tents for work
spaces (purchased for semi-permanent
locations during insurgency campaigns)
are difficult to camouflage and conceal.
Dispersed 18 x 24-footers, either under
a camouflage net or hidden in buildings
of opportunity, are far easier to hide,
even if they are in the same general
location.
Accommodation
tentage
presents an even larger footprint,
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ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
which could be broken up and hidden
in buildings of opportunity or removed
entirely. Personnel could sleep on camp
cots under ponchos or on roll mats in
a treeline. It must be recognised that
however unpleasant living in cold, wet
and austere conditions is, it is preferable
to dying in comfort.
Balance. Clearly there are balances
that need to be found between comfort
and survivability, effectiveness and
efficiency. Living under a poncho may be
survivable, but over time it would degrade
the ability of the headquarters to be
effective. Similarly, living in a comfortable
tented city may be very effective until it
is struck by the enemy. The aim of this
article is not to strip out everything in the
service of efficiency, but rather to raise
questions over how we do business as
a corps headquarters. As a multinational
organisation, cultural change can be a
slow and potentially contentious process,
but we need to be willing to take risks
and see if we are capable of rebalancing
our comfort, survivability and efficiency
with an acceptable level of effectiveness.
Conclusion
While it is argued that form follows
function, the assumption that the
headquarters will naturally find an
effective and efficient configuration is
flawed. While it is true that it is relatively
easy to introduce new ideas, it is very
hard to get rid of the old ones. Indeed,
staff officers can fall victim to the
temptation to follow the path of least
cognitive resistance in an attempt to
maintain current working practices and
support a familiar status quo. Often
this leads to greater levels of exertion
to produce lower quality output. This is
not to say that officers are intellectually
lazy, rather they are the product of
their experience. Fifteen years of
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is not
helpful. The ARRC must be bold and
work from basic principles rather than
rely on the inherited wisdom of ‘this is
how we do things’.
The ARRC is one of the most influential
innovators across NATO; rewriting corps
doctrine has sparked the interest of many
countries across NATO. The Survive to
Command concept was a welcome leap
forward in the return to corps warfighting.
Exercise ARRCADE FUSION 19 is a
rare opportunity to experiment without
the spectre of CREVAL hovering at our
shoulder. With many countries looking at
the ARRC to give insight into the future
of modern warfare, the ARRC has a
responsibility to show that the status quo
does not limit our thinking and should not
limit theirs.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Major John Westwood, British Army,
currently serves in the G1 Plans section
as part of the ARRC’s Support Division.
Captain Miles Cuff, British Army, currently
serves in the G1 Plans section as part of
the ARRC’s Support Division.