READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
THE NATURE OF
NEWS AND THE
MILITARY LEADER:
A PRIMER
Lieutenant Colonel Adam Hallmark, United States Army
Generations of military leaders have been ingrained with Clausewitz’s theory that
while war’s character changes with time its nature remains constant. 1 Whilst history
demonstrates that military tactics and operational approach tend to lag behind war’s
changing character, military leaders nevertheless understand Clausewitz’s theory and
instinctively adapt. 2
Today, where the 24-hour news cycle
permeates virtually every facet of our
lives, Clausewitz’s theory is equally
applicable with respect to the character
and nature of news. Unlike the military
leader’s instinctive adaption to war’s
character and nature, history lacks in
demonstrating the same insomuch
as the character and nature of news
are concerned. Instead, it reveals a
consistent clash of professions rooted
in simple ignorance of one another.
The chief result of these fundamental
misunderstandings is a mutual mistrust
that can lead to awkward interactions
between commanders and the media
as well as commanders and their
designated Public Affairs Officers (PAO)
attempting to bring the two together. 3
Such
misunderstandings
and
awkwardness are entirely avoidable. In
much the same way that military leaders
comprehend the nature and character
of war, so, too, must they with regard to
the news and, by extension, the mass
media. Despite the information revolution
that has redefined the character of news
during the last 25 years, this essay will
not address it. Although unquestionably
important, the current character of news
is a separate topic entirely and one to
be addressed only after the nature of
news is made clear. To that end this
essay will seek to familiarise the military
leader – specifically those reluctant
or apprehensive about engaging the
media – with a brief history of military-
media relations. More importantly, it will
seek to impart a basic, fundamental
understanding regarding the nature of
news and provide an academic lens
through which to view, understand and
approach civilian media operations by
making military leaders aware of two
critical communication theories.
How Did We Get Here?
That military leaders have historically
struggled to consider or contend with
mass media during operations is nothing
new. 4 This is not to say, however, that
history is absent of instances where
they do. For example, both British Army
and American rebel leadership during
the American Revolution purposefully
waged a war of information against one
another in vying – via American colonial
mass media – for colonists’ sympathies,
This 1770 engraving by Paul Revere depicts a
propagandised version of the so-called Boston
Massacre. The fake news of its day, it affected
colonial sentiments in New England and directly
contributed to commencement of the American
Revolution in 1775.
which were not, interestingly enough,
wholly in favour of independence. 5 6
Comparatively speaking, though, these
efforts were more akin to psychological
operations than anything resembling
modern-day Public Affairs operations. 7
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm.
2 Williamson Murray, “Military Adaptation in War,” Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2009, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/ona_murray_adapt_in_war.pdf.
3 Stephanie Oram, “Telling the Story: Impact of Military-Media Relations on the Operational Commander,” (Final, United States Naval War College, 1993).
4 Oram, “Telling the Story”.
5 Robert Parkinson, “Print, the Press, and the American Revolution,” Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of American History, September 2015, http://oxfordre.com/americanhistory/view/10.1093/
acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-9?print=pdf.
6 Douglas Porch, “No Bad Stories: The American Media-Military Relationship,” Naval War College Review 55, no. 1 (Winter 2002), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/art5-w02.htm.
7 John Snyder, “Seeing through the Conflict: Military-Media Relations,” (Strategy research project, United States Army War College, 2003), 6.
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
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