ARRC JOURNAL
audiences and failed to proliferate into
western media. After a week it had little
more than 300 shares on Facebook. 28 The
UK Ministry of Defence and NATO did not
counter the article publicly. The reason
– on average, basic Kremlin botnets
are between 150 and 400 ‘profiles’ in
size. 29 It was therefore assessed that the
content was circulated by a botnet with
very little human interaction. Countering
the story would have compounded its
effect and provided the conduit for the
message to reach audiences it would not
have otherwise.
Information operations are the marketing
of an idea. 30 NATO and British messaging
must be timely and targeted. This
granular detail enables planners to focus
on incremental gains that, when planned
in tandem with conventional operations,
will not only enable manoeuvre, but also
prepare the ground for future operations.
Ambiguity will remain a part of the
future battlespace as practitioners have
a limited intellectual capacity and are
subject to numerous physical factors
– examples are emotions, fog of war
and fatigue. 31 Ambiguity is not always
misinformation. Utilising ambiguity in the
face of the enemy will be a significant
capability in future deep operations as
its utility extends from the reinforcement
of tactical deception to the enabling of
strategic dialogue (feints to peace talks).
Ambiguity is timeless, unconstrained and
is subject to simultaneous interpretation.
When information is interpreted, it is
done so subjectively and based on the
interpreter’s experiences, group social
norms and moral state. 32 The timeless
and uncontrollable nature of ambiguity is
at odds with peoples’ view that everything
has constraints – for example, the truth is
a constant. It is assumed that when the
truth is established that the discussion is
therefore complete. However, today the
Kremlin continues narratives past this
point and creates ambiguity, which can
then become self-perpetuating.
Just as intelligence has counter-
intelligence, so, too, must future
information operations. For example, the
Chinese fleet sailing to St. Petersburg to
take part in joint exercises with Russia’s
Baltic fleet during the summer of 2017. 33
The Kremlin chose to release articles
highlighting its ‘special’ relationship
with China, with whom it shares military
technology and, to a degree, ideology.
However, the UK has a close relationship
with Beijing, too, which is focused
primarily on economics, but military
exercises have also taken place. The
ambiguity of the Kremlin’s message in
this case was that Russia has a uniquely
special relationship that others do not,
but without stating directly its exclusivity
and just merely suggesting it. To combat
this messaging, a cross government/
alliance response is required. This broad
response adds credibility and maximises
the use of channels already open to
consumer audiences. For example, the
UK could highlight its operations with the
Chinese Navy off the coast of Somalia. 34
Immediately the Kremlin’s message is
diluted and consumers are encouraged
to investigate alternative views. Even
so, some audiences remain incredibly
difficult to reach. These are populations
that fundamentally believe messages
they receive from the Kremlin. Through
long-term planning and better targeting,
the selected audiences can be equipped
with the tools to look elsewhere for their
alternative truths.
Ambiguity will endure, however the
weaponised form used by the Kremlin
can be countered in a number of ways.
First, by controlling the context in which
information is interpreted. For the
Kremlin to succeed it does not need to
convert audiences to its worldview; it
just simply needs to convert them to
any other than the current. Divide and
rule. When the West addresses Russia
it addresses Russia as a whole – all
audiences, populations, ethnic groups –
suggesting that the West thinks Russia
is one homogenous mass. The Kremlin’s
approach is more sophisticated; it singles
out organisations or people, making it
personal. The Kremlin succeeds in subtly
signposting the audience’s attention to
where they want it to be, manipulating
and misinforming as needed.
to do so highlights insecurities and a
fundamental lack of understanding of
Russia and its people. In Russian politics,
a strong Russia is seen as a stabilising
force in the world. They will only be
content when Russia feels respected by
the rest of the world.
Finally, the West must be equipped at
every level to coordinate efforts and
embrace the complexity of ambiguity. As
the Chief of Swedish Defence Forces,
Maj. Gen. Karl Engelbrektson stated,
“War is a contest of will.” Gen. John
‘Mick’ Nicholson likewise stated, “War
is staying power.” 35 36 Maintaining public
support is crucial as it is indivisible from
political will. The five domains must act in
synergy across all military, governmental
and alliance levels to contest and win
future conflicts. The information war
manifests itself as the passage of
information, by any means, to the public
on both sides of future conflicts. Owning
at least part of this domain will affect
all future conflicts and should be a key
tenant of strategic planners.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Captain Robert Atchison is a seven-
year veteran of the British Army and
currently serves as the Executive Officer
to the ARRC’s Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations. In his previous assignment
he served as the Influence lead for
the British Army’s enhanced Forward
Presence (eFP) battlegroup in Tapa,
Estonia. Capt. Atchison has led influence
operations across a number of different
theatres to include Afghanistan and in
Eastern and Northern Europe. A native
of Liverpool, England, Capt. Atchison
holds an Honours Degree in Physics
from Aberystwyth University.
Second, the West must continue its
transparency when combating ambiguity.
The UK and the West must avoid
criticising Russia as a whole and instead
target and refine responses. Failing
28 Author’s research during event.
29 Author worked with EST, UK and FRA OGDs on assessment
30 Ben Davis, “What exactly is marketing ops?” Econsultancy, January 18, 2017, https://econsultancy.com/what-exactly-is-marketing-ops/.
31 The Intellectual “Bell Curve”
32 Will Fanguy, “Seeing is believing: 5 studies about visual information processing,” Piktochart, https://piktochart.com/blog/5-psychology-studies-that-tell-us-how-people-perceive-visual-
information/.
33 Author Unknown, “Chinese military vessels enter Russia’s Baltic for 1st time as joint drills kick off,” RT, July 21, 2017, https://www.rt.com/news/397096-china-russia-sea-drills/.
34 Marc Lanteigne, “Fire over water: China’s strategic engagement of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden crisis,” The Pacific Review, March 8, 2013, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
full/10.1080/09512748.2012.759265?src=recsys.
35 Speech as part of the 2018 International Armoured Vehicles Conference London.
36 During Gen Nicholson’s speech on Op INHERENT RESOLVE during the 2018 International Armoured Vehicles Conference London.
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