ARRC Journal 2019 | Page 54

ARRC JOURNAL extensive freedoms to prosecute their mission; the Kremlin is, however, not the exclusive customer. 7 Global use is increasing, both state and non-state sponsored, as their tactical utility becomes evident through a number of countries and organisations’ experimentation. They are not constrained by international law or obliged to tell the truth, something their opponents are subject to. Figure 1 depicts a personal echo chamber. Every person has one and it can be affected, if targeted correctly. Additionally, the Kremlin does not seek to convert the world to its own way, but to any other than the current. Business theory conceptualises this in FUD: Fear, uncertainty and doubt. 8 Spread mistruths about a competitor’s product to undermine consumer confidence and observe what happens. In political theory this is understood as ‘divide and rule’. The scale at which the Kremlin operates is well known, however, its behaviour in the information domain draws distinct parallels to Mao’s three-phased insurgency tactics. These phases are organisation and preparation, terrorism and guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare. 9 Phase One The Kremlin has created capable organisations, both nationally and internationally, that enable the preparation of the ‘cyber ground’. Information is fed into echo chambers already established in targeted audiences (countries, social demographics, ages, social media channels, to name but a few), introducing, reinforcing or manipulating narratives depending on the mission and at a time of their choosing. The mission’s time scale is often irrelevant as it can vary from hours to years. An enemy will seek to set conditions that are favourable in a battlespace that is yet to be realised. The preparation conducted by cyber soldiers relies on the fact that information must remain relevant to the target audience, sometimes even allowing counter information to propagate and ‘trend’ in the information space. 10 Context is subjective and a simple example is the use or misuse of punctuation: The panda eats, shoots, and leaves versus the panda eats shoots and leaves. Context one is violent and loud, the second Figure 1 simply calorific consumption. Correct punctuation is now almost voluntary and, with its decay, misunderstanding spreads and leads to ambiguity. 11 In Syria, the Kremlin understood that, after years of conflict, many media users were ready to support anyone with a consistent and believable message no matter how abhorrent it might be. 12 The use of chemical weapons was a red line for President Obama’s administration; the repercussions on those who used such weapons made clear. 13 However, after numerous chemical attacks on civilians little physical action followed. Furthermore, the West’s diplomatic position was often too complicated to be widely understood and remained unconvincing to the Syrian population. In contrast, the Kremlin synchronised its information campaigns with compelling and convincing physical action. This linkage of the physical and informational domains gave the Kremlin more credibility and a larger share of the regional audience. 7 Simon Shuster, “This KGB Chief Rang the Alarm About Russia-U.S. Cyberwars. No One Listened,” Time, March 23, 2018, http://time.com/5210728/russia-u-s-hacking-cyberwar-kgb-soviet- union/. 8 Author Unkonwn, “Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt (FUD),” Changing Minds,” http://changingminds.org/disciplines/sales/articles/fud.htm. 9 Author Unknown, “The Three Stages of Mao’s Revolutionary Warfare,” Parallel Narratives, https://parallelnarratives.com/the-three-stages-of-maos-revolutionary-warfare/. 10 Jen Marchetti, “How Marketers Must Evolve to Remain Relevant in a ‘Post-Millennial’ World,” Entrepreneur, March 5, 2018, https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/309145. 11 http://littlecalamity.tripod.com/Text/Newspaper.html 12 Post operation interview with Capt Richard Luckyn-Malone 77X. 13 Pamela Engel, “Obama reportedly declined to enforce red line in Syria after Iran threatened to back out of nuclear deal,” Business Insider, August 23, 2016, https://www.businessinsider.com/ obama-red-line-syria-iran-2016-8?r=UK. 54 ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS