ARRC JOURNAL
each working group (WG). There could
also be input from higher and subordinate
formations through the presence of
liaison officers (LO) and the IMIB could
be co-chaired by the Assistant Chief of
Staff (ACOS) G6 and ACOS Influence.
Given the IMIB level of expertise and
its outputs, another implication could be
that the Chief G6 may have to co-chair
the targeting board with Chief of the
Joint Fires and Influence Branch (JFIB)
in order to better synchronise the way
lethal and non-lethal effects are to be
achieved.
Another positive aspect of the IMIB is
that it may not necessarily overburden
an already busy battle rhythm. It could
integrate several information centric
WGs under its umbrella, such as
the CIS WG, CEMA and Frequency
Management (FMAN) WG, G2 FUSION
WG and Information Activities (IA)
WG. The IMIB could then act as a filter
and feed relevant information into the
ARRC main planning events, such
as the Initial Planning Group (IPG),
the Operations Coordination Planning
Group (OCPG), the Targeting (TGT)
WG and the Synchronisation Board.
The Force Protection (FP) and Key
Leader Engagement (KLE) WGs would
also benefit from the IMIB outputs. The
IMIB could formally take place every 96
hours or on call to exploit time-sensitive
opportunities. Figure 2 demonstrates
how the IMIB might integrate into the
ARRC battle rhythm:
Figure 3 – Possible composition of the ARRC IMG and link with the IMIB.
be IMG
supported
legal and political
the ARRC IMG
the composition
support of of the ARRC
Figure with
3 – Possible
and link with by
the IMIB.
advisors. These individuals would set the
specialised teams/cells from the units
framework for the ARRC IMG to conduct
within UK Force Troops Command (FTC).
information activities both in the physical
These teams/cells would augment the 1
and virtual domains.
(UK) Sig Bde headquarters and enable
the link from the ARRC headquarters to
Conclusion
the units that would execute the orders
of the IMIB. At present, as the concept
As with any significant change of
is in its early stages, the ARRC IMG will
approach, the IMIB and IMG would need
be comprised of only UK units, but could
careful testing and tailoring over time.
have the ability to intergrate other NATO
The concept will be tested for the first
units that might become available if their
time during Exercise ARRCADE FUSION
countries so wish.
2019 and then it may be internationally
exposed as the ARRC is placed on corps
Figure 3 above demonstrates the
standby.
proposed relationship between the IMIB
and the ARRC IMG. It also provides
examples of UK units that would transform
IMIB guidance into action. At this stage,
most of the FTC units envisaged for
the
ARRC
IMG
already have in place
a Command and
Control
Technical
Arrangement (C2TA)
with the ARRC, which
would facilitate the
initiative.
Given the sensitivity
of the work that the
ARRC IMG would be
required to undertake
(ie,
offensive
cyber or spectrum
Figure 2 – The ARRC IMIB relations to other BR events. 2
m a n a g e m e n t
Figure 2 – The ARRC IMIB relations to other BR events. 2(footnote)
operations), there is a degree of
Information Manoeuvre Group
uncertainty as to who, how and when
the effects required by the IMIB would
Another important part of the Information
be delivered. This is well understood at
Manoeuvre concept is the creation of an
the ARRC and close coordination will
ARRC Information Manoeuvre Group
be required between the ARRC and
(IMG), which would execute the plans
specialised UK units. Furthermore, due to
of the IMIB. The guidance presented
possible legal and political repercussions
within the ECAB paper proposes that
of non-lethal effects that may occur
commander of the 1st (UK) Signal
during operations, the ARRC IMIB would
Brigade (1 (UK) Sig Bde) commands
The Information Manoeuvre concept
could bring the ARRC into a position
of advantage compared to similar
headquarters around the world and
strengthen it as a corps. Whilst it will be
challenging to implement the IMIB and to
create the ARRC IMG, it is a worthwhile
endeavour. The anticipated benefits
could make a significant difference when
executing operations against a near peer
threat in an environment that is becoming
more and more information centric.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Captain Bogdan Ionescu is a 12-
year veteran of the Romanian Army
and currently serves as the Signals
Operations and Plans Officer (G6) for
the ARRC. In his previous assignment
he served as the Operations and Plans
Officer for the Romania Army and he has
led Signals operations as part of combat
operations in Afghanistan. A native of
Botosani, Romania, Capt. Ionescu holds
a Master’s Degree in Conflict Analysis
and Resolution from the National
School of Political Science and Public
Administration in Bucharest, Romania.
2 Communication & Information Systems (CIS); STRATCOM (SC); Information Activities (IA); Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA); Initial Planning Group (IPG); Operations
Coordination Planning Group (OCPG); Targeting (TGT); Force Protection (FP); and Key Leader Engagement (KLE).
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