READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
understand why it exists, establish how
it must operate to justify this existence,
and, finally, what resources are needed
to facilitate its operation. To try and
reduce the ‘what’ without understanding
the ‘how’ or ‘why’ will lead to a failure of
tactical control, which is the essential
purpose of the Main CP.
Outputs (Why). The Main CP holds
tactical control over the Corps, delivering
essential functions that can only take
place in the battlespace: Planning,
sustainment, enabling and assessment.
All activity within the Main CP must
service these functions. Any activity not
essential to these functions or could
occur outside theatre should be reduced
or eliminated. This should be extended to
functions that are performed by higher or
lower formations.
Processes (How). The processes that
drive the battle rhythm of the Main CP
must be effective in the first instance. If
a process does not deliver an essential
function then it must be eliminated. Once
unnecessary processes have been
removed, what remains must be refined
until they are the most efficient way of
delivering effective output. Specifically,
processes must use as few resources as
possible (time, space, personnel, power
and bandwidth).
Physical requirements (What). The
physical requirements of the Main CP
must be the minimum required to enable
processes to deliver essential outputs.
Any physical assets beyond this must be
eliminated.
Proposals
Outputs. The ARRC has been
naturally influenced by the last 18
years of counterinsurgency operations.
Accustomed to thinking like a joint
task force (JTF) operating from a fixed
base, there are many functions and
outputs that are simply not necessary.
This has led to a bloated establishment
and replication of JTF and divisional
activities that are not needed within
a tactical corps headquarters. Of the
many examples that come to mind,
strategic communication (STRATCOM)
is arguably not a corps function as the
corps implements STRATCOM from the
higher formation. Another example is
G2 analysis, which is a corps function,
but does not have to be in theatre. The
C2WG is currently working on identifying
functions that can be performed out of
theatre using a ‘reach-back’ model and
reducing unnecessary functions.
Processes.
The
headquarters
undertakes many processes to deliver
its essential outputs. Nearly all of
The UPDF planned and executed the deployment of a brigade to South Sudan using only maps,
whiteboards, notebooks and two mobile phones.
these are technologically enabled, but
as processes have been adapted to
meet the requirements of advancing
technology, both effectiveness and
efficiency have suffered.
Computers were designed to perform
calculations that were too time consuming
for a human to perform manually. They
are very good at maintaining a high level
of accuracy when conducting repetitive
tasks, however they are often not utilised
in this way.
The negative impact of email on
productivity and trust has been well
documented. Unfortunately, this has
had little impact on the headquarters;
despite acknowledging that face-to-face
communication is optimal and preferred,
email remains the most prevalent
method – even between people working
in the same tent.
The use of PowerPoint as a briefing,
planning, and working tool has grown
exponentially in the last decade, yet
many of the tasks it is used to perform
could be achieved better by other
means. Increasingly, the veneer of good
presentation is over-valued when the
same or better effect could be achieved
with a concise verbal brief and sketch.
Too much time is spent perfecting slide
packs that add little value and receive
cursory attention. Planning teams can
work much more effectively around
a map with a scribe producing a set
of written orders, rather than getting
bogged down in slides, templates and
software. Doubtless, other processes
would benefit from a similar approach.
The desire for an ‘all-informed net’ has
utility to a point, however, this has led
to tents full of people staring at JCHAT
or navigating SharePoint rather than
adding value to the operational outputs
of the headquarters. Maintaining
situational awareness can be as simple
as a watchkeeper calling out issues as
they arise or a regular verbal SITREP.
This essay seeks
to outline the basic
principles that should
be used to reduce
the footprint of the
Main CP and increase
survivability.
Additionally,
providing
continuous
operations does not mean that the
headquarters must be fully manned 24/7.
The close battle is being conducted by
the divisions and the corps has limited
ability to affect anything in real time. Most
branches do not need to be physically
represented during silent hours. For
example, planning teams are looking
beyond 96 hours and should not routinely
need to work beyond normal working
hours. Periods of high tempo may
require longer days, but this should be
the exception rather than the rule. Other
outputs may not require representation
outside key battle rhythm events and
can therefore release personnel to
conduct rest and personal administration
activities.
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
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