ARRC Journal 2019 | Page 30

ARRC JOURNAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: A POORLY UNDERSTOOD CONSTRUCT? Major Guy Cheesman, British Army Doctrine concerning understanding and decision-making emphasises the importance of situational awareness (SA), yet stops short of satisfactorily explaining the construct. 1 The author describes SA using Mica Endsley’s model of dynamic decision-making, referenced in Joint Doctrine Note 3/11, and shows why team and shared SA (SSA) is not derived simply from the sum of individuals’ SA. 2 Origins of SA Oswald Boelke is generally attributed as the first person to chronicle SA as a construct, recognising the “importance of gaining an awareness of the enemy before the enemy gained a similar awareness.” 3 Academic research came much later, its rising prominence driven by attempts to better understand the ability of people to perform complex tasks in dynamic environments. 4 5 A commonly agreed definition does not exist, although the construct is commonly accepted as extending from individual SA (to Team, then to Shared SA (SSA)) and is described both as a product and a process. 6 7 Situational Awareness is defined within NATO doctrine as the “knowledge of the elements in the battlespace necessary to make well- informed decisions.” 8 9 Importance of SA to Decision Making and Military outputs Within NATO, SA is deemed vital to generating desired military outputs, linked together by the commander’s primary duty: Decision making. 10 Research supports this notion, emphasising SA as being the key feature dictating the success of the decision process, which is a pre-condition for the commander to achieve execution superiority. 11 12 13 Individual SA Three classifications of individual SA stand out: Definitions based upon how individuals process information, definitions that emphasise an individual’s mental representation of reality (dynamic reflection) and those that centre on the interactions between the individual and the world around them. 15 Since the tidal point of research seeking to define SA, Mica Endsley’s explanation appears more than any other since its publication in 1987 and informs influential books on the construct. 15 Endsley defines SA as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future.” 16 Her definition comprises three 1 JDP 04 Understanding and Decision Making, JDN 3/11 Decision Making and Problem Solving: Human and Organisational Factors 2 JDN 3/11 para 221. 3 Gilson 1995, p.3. 4 Endsley & Jones 2012 p.13, Salmon et al 2009 p.8, Panteli & Kirschen 2014, Durso and Gronlund 1999. 5 Smith & Hancock 1995, p.137, Sarter & Woods 1991 p.47. 6 Salmon et al 2009 p.8. 7 Endsley and Jones 2012 p.19, Salas et’al 1995 p.124. 8 JDP 01.1.1. 30 ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS levels: Perception, comprehension and projection, which are situated in her dynamic decision making model (Figure 1). She argues that an individual must first perceive the elements within a situation, derived through an individual’s senses. The next step is to comprehend what elements mean through their synthesis and, importantly, in the context of their task or mission. The third stage is the short-term projection of what might happen based on achieving Level 1 and Level 2 SA, from which a decision is made and an action follows. The observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop can be mapped across this model, making it entirely relevant for use by commanders at the tactical level. There are critics of Endsley’s model, although the merits of this and other SA research fall outside the scope of this essay. 17 9 AAP 06 2017 p104. 10 AJP 01, para 5.2, MoD 2016 para 0606. 11 Endsley, 1995 p.34, Salas et al 1995 p.123, Smith and Hancock 1995 p.140, Bedne & Mesiter 1999 p.64, Flach 1995 p.151. 12 Endsley and Jones 2012, p.10. 13 ARRC SOI 0070. 14 Stanton, Chambers and Piggot 2001, Salmon et al 2009. 15 Wickens 2008 p.397, Salmon et al, 2009 p.8. 16 Endsley, 1995 p.36. 17 Salmon et al 2009 p. 18, Bedny and Meister 1999 p.65.