ARRC Journal 2019 | Page 26

ARRC JOURNAL Last, but not least, failure in identifying a specific entity as a CoG – what the CoG is, in terms of name – does not mean the end of the world. There may be times when a COG is clear. Yet, often the real COG will be difficult to determine due to a tendency to identify a single source of power for all the identified CCs. Most of the time, particularly in a complex operational environment, planners link the CCs with more than two CRs. In situations like this, planners can find themselves involved in long lasting discussions and arguments about what the CoG is. However, even under these circumstances there is no issue. We could recommend ‘do not pay so much attention to the name of the CoG’ – ‘Don’t waste your valuable time’. The aim of CoG analysis is not to provide a name for a CoG by which the enemy will be defeated. Rather, the crucial purpose of the process is to identify CRs and CVs. Through these two critical factors the commander can avoid strengths and exploit vulnerabilities, and select an operational approach to degrade an adversary’s capabilities and minimise the exposure of his own. Besides, a revision of the analysis later may have better and more accurate results in terms of the CoG name, if one believes it a problem. Challenging the CoG Although the concept of CoG has been adopted by NATO and various other militaries, it is a controversial issue. It has received a lot of criticism related primarily to its relevance. How can a 200-year-old concept, with reference to warfare tactics, equipment and conditions completely different from our modern operational environment, be relevant today? Military theorists and planners are debating over the utility and relevance of the CoG, even after more than 30 years after its introduction into military doctrine and implementation. 40 In fact, the criticism of CoG could be viewed as an outcome of its ‘experimental’ use in the modern operational environment (e.g. Iraq). The lack, or the vagueness, of CoG’s definition as well as the absence of an efficient and effective analysis method led to operational shortfalls, a waste of time and resources and, consequently, to arguments about the utility of the CoG concept in the modern operational environment. A Source of Criticism • Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (1990-91): A lack of common and clarified COG definition resulted in shortfalls in unity of effort and synchronisation. General Norman Schwarzkopf selected three CoGs rather than focus on one. They were: leadership and C2 nodes, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the Republican Guard Forces. The leadership and C2 CoG fit the Air Force’s airpower. The Republican Guard CoG fit the Army’s understanding of the COG so that was their focus. Both services considered the WMD COG necessary, albeit a distraction. The result was separate service/domain fights that independently focussed on different CoGs and produced needless friction. • Iraq 2005: The lack of a practical COG identification process led General George Casey to misidentify the true COG. Planners briefed him on two CoGs: the Iraqi government and the population. One planner, using a then-current doctrinal method, recommended the Iraqi government. Col Eikmeier proposed the population as the COG. Using a “not in doctrine” method of ends, ways, and means analysis, he concluded that the population would decide the outcome of the insurgency; they were the “doer” and the COG. General Casey selected the Iraqi government as the COG. Months later in 2006 the insurgency rose to new levels of violence. In 2007, General David Petraeus took command and implemented a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. His strategy saw significant elements of the population turn against the insurgents, resulting in coalition and Iraqi security forces rolling back the insurgency. Eikmeier Dale. The Center of Gravity. Still Relevant After All These Years? Colonel Dale Eikmeier recognises two trends of criticism about the irrelevance of CoG: ‘Practitioners’ and ‘philosophers’. Both reject the concept of CoG, but for different reasons. • The so-called ‘practitioners’ consider the CoG an abstract concept with vague, unclear definition and thus is not useful. After many years of discussions about what a CoG is – changes of definition – and how a CoG can be identified and used in planning (an overview provided above) led to confusion and denial. How could such an unsettled theory underpin the development of a plan? Thus, they reject the CoG as a planning tool, primarily due to its poor definition, doctrinal shortfalls and lack of clear method of analysis. • ‘Philosophers’ reject it because it is an old concept that is not relevant today. Their main argument is based on the tactical, technological and philosophical differences between the 18th century and our era. They argue that a pre-industrial military concept is not applicable to our technologically advanced age of the complex operational environment of hybrid or insurgency warfare. It is not relevant anymore. It is too simple a concept to assist in understanding a contemporary, rapidly changing and complicated operational environment with non-state actors involved in conflicts. Nevertheless, the relevance of the CoG theory should be seen through the lens of its utility. It could be said that if something is useful then it is still relevant. Planning develops viable options to achieve an acceptable outcome from an unacceptable situation. The results of planning articulate how actions (ways) and resources (means) are used to achieve objectives (ends). 41 In these two last sentences lies the usefulness of CoG as a planning tool. As long as planning remains relevant, regardless of technological advancements and tactics, the CoG is also relevant. As briefly explained at the beginning of this essay, since the introduction of CoG in modern military doctrine/planning, its definition and implementation has conceptually evolved. Its definition has been simplified and an analytical methodology has been developed. The CoG has become a useful planning tool as it is explained below: • First, no matter how complex the operational environment is, it contributes to understanding of the operational problem. The CoG analysis method through the Critical Factors (CCs-CRs-CVs) promotes understanding of complex systems – with state and non-state actors – reaching reasonable conclusions about the interdependence and interaction of the different actors involved in a conflict. The CoG links the aim/objectives of actors, the ways or actions each actor will use to achieve the objectives (CCs), the means – what gives each actor the ability to support its ways (CRs – CoG), and finally vulnerabilities (CVs). In this way, planners acquire a clear picture of the trends in the operational environment, focussing on specific actors and relationships. The CoG concept mitigates the complexity of the 39 Rueschhoff, Jan L. & Dunne, Jonathan. Ibid, p.121-122. 40 The concept of CoG provokes discussions about its utility and relevance today. The following articles and the respective comments by readers give an idea of the ongoing debate. Col. Dale C. Eikmeier, US Army, Retired. Give Carl von Clausewitz and the Center of Gravity a Divorce, Small Wars Journal, July 2, 2013, at http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/give-carl-von- clausewitz-and-the-center-of-gravity-a-divorce and Col. Dale 26 ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS