READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
Furthermore, the vulnerabilities of a
CoG could be divided into two broad
categories: Inherent and external. The
former refer to weaknesses that may
exist within a strength-CoG and are
vulnerable to attack. The latter include
external factors or conditions, which
actually neutralise its impact on the
battle or degrade the strength-CoG,
undermining its supporting elements-
CRs (Figure 18). 35
adversary’s aim/objectives, CCs and
CRs can lead to shortfalls in analysing its
CoG, which will have a negative impact
on friendly operations. For example,
if the adversary’s estimated aim is to
occupy an island, the operational CoG
could be the amphibious task force. If
the estimated aim is to occupy a piece
of land, in this case the CoG could be his
operational reserve.
As described above,
CVs are derived from
the vulnerable or
deficient aspects of
CRs. However, to get
the most out of the
analysis, the efforts
should put not only
focus on determining
if a CR is vulnerable,
but also how the CR
Figure 18 – Achilles’ Inherent and External Vulnerabilities
is vulnerable. The
‘how’ leads to OEs, OAs and joint tasks
Given the inherent and external
to subordinates. In addition, the steps of
vulnerabilities of a CoG, it could be said
the analysis do not always need to be in a
that there are three principal ways of
specific order. There may be times when
defeating or neutralising a CoG: Make
discovering a vulnerability or requirement
the CoG irrelevant; strip the CoG of
may result in the identification of a CC.
the support it needs to be successful;
For example, an actor has acquired
and defeat the CoG by exploiting its
amphibious landing craft from an ally.
weaknesses. In this sense, when we
In this case, landing craft could be a
look for CVs in CoG Analysis we look
CR for a new CC, the ability to conduct
for intrinsic vulnerabilities and external
amphibious operations. In turn, this may
vulnerabilities (Figure 19). 36
Figure 19 – Ways of Defeating or Neutralising a CoG
An efficient analysis of an actor’s critical
factors (CCs, CRs, CVs) requires the
best available knowledge about its
structure, training, organisation, doctrine,
decision-making
process,
physical
and psychological strengths, and
weaknesses. The more one understands
the more effective the analysis will
be. Wrong estimates regarding an
indicate that the adversary may also be
adjusting his objectives.
The CoG analysis should be a constant
process. Changes of the conditions/
systems may have implications on
the CoG analysis. In this sense, the
change of an actor’s stance can lead
to different course of action or aim/
objectives (e.g. the entrance of the USA
in the Second World War changed the
course of the Battle of the Atlantic due
to its overwhelming sea and air power
along with technological advancement
– radar and long range aircraft led
to a different approach/strategy and,
consequently, Germany’s defeat). In
addition, alteration of the friendly Course
of Action (COA) can cause shifts to the
source of power or its critical elements,
which depends on the mission because
the changes in priorities and importance
of capabilities (e.g. occupation of an
island can be achieved by Amphibious
Task Force (amphibious assault) or
an Airborne Brigade (air assault)) may
result in different ways, means and
CoG. Therefore, the planners should
periodically revise the CoG analysis.
In the above context, the CoG may change
from phase to phase. For example, during
counterinsurgency operations, during
the preparation of the revolution the CoG
may be the leadership or insurgent cells
that motivate and train the personnel for
the upcoming insurgent fight. When the
revolution starts the CoG is usually the
insurgent fighting force. This is normal.
A change of the objective is translated to
a change of the ways (CCs) and means
(CRs). In the pre-revolutionary phase
the objective is the preparation – set
the conditions for insurgency through
ideological
motivation,
recruitment,
procurement of equipment and training.
Once the revolution begun the goal is the
removal of the existing government and
establishment of a new one – the change
of a state’s order. 37
Moreover, by analysing a CoG the efforts
are directed to identifying the current CCs,
CRs and CVs. Focussing on a present
adversary’s capabilities undermines the
friendly future threats and operations.
Once friendly objectives have been
achieved, the defeated adversary may
change its objectives or other actors may
decide to exploit the opportunity within it.
In this case, the estimated adversary’s
future objectives are the starting point
in identifying the CCs and the CRs
that would be needed in achieving
his aim. Planners mitigate this gap of
knowledge through risk management
and developing branch plans as well
as sequels. 38 During the development
of branch plans and sequels, planners
revisit the CoG analysis, based on the
changes of the conditions/actors.
35 Dr. Strange Joe & Col. Iron Richard (UK Army). Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, Part 2, p.5-6, at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf (accessed
10 Sep 18).
36 Dr. Strange Joe & Col. Iron Richard (UK Army), Ibid.
37 Christopher M. Schnaubelt, et.al, Ibid, p.17-18.
38 Planners should identify potential risks to the achievement of operational objectives or risks to the force that result from the operational environment or the capabilities and actions of the main
actors in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). COPD, Ibid, 4-49,4-50. Branch plans address the question ‘what if’, while the sequel ‘what next’. COPD, Ibid, 4-57.
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