breaching the deal with the international community provoking renewed hardship for the people. History, including recent Middle Eastern history, teaches us that people
suffering increasing poverty and deprivation of basic
needs eventually rise up even against the most oppressive
regimes. In the past years, Tehran has been reminded of
that truth as they witnessed the long-standing regimes in
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya being swept away during the socalled Arab Spring.
Should Iran have worked on a nuclear weapons program, and it is to assume that the country at least worked
towards reaching breakout capability, an essential motivation was of a defensive nature. Unlike some statements
by former Iranian President Ahmadinejad and others in
Tehran or the mantra-like warnings of Israeli politicians
might suggest, the Iranian regime certainly never sought
to acquire nuclear weapons to launch an offensive attack
on Israel or any other country for that matter. One might
argue that Tehran’s policy objectives and actions are radical, but the Iranian regime is certainly neither irrational nor suicidal. On the contrary, post-revolutionary Iran
picked up or stepped up its nuclear development when the
regime was or perceived itself on the defensive. This was
the case following Iraq’s deployment of chemical weapons
during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s as well as after U.S.
President George W. Bush’s Axis of Evil Speech in 2002
and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Therefore, there are strong indicators that Iran’s potential striving for nuclear weapons was driven by defensive
motivations. The case of North Korea shows clearly that
all talk of externally induced regime change is off the table
once a state, even a pariah state, has crossed the nuclear
weapons threshold. It stands to reason that Tehran at least
for a time wanted to follow North Korea’s example.
weapons program, such as the construction of the nuclear
fuel enrichment plant in Fordow or the supposed nuclear
detonator tests, as proof of Iran’s lacking trustworthiness.
According to the critics, the JCPOA would grant Iran the
time and, following the suspension of the sanctions, additional financial means to complete the development of a
nuclear bomb. Therefore, sanctions should stay in place
until the Iranian regime is toppled or forced to give up its
nuclear program entirely.
In conjunction with the prediction of Iran cheating and
secretly developing nuclear weapons, opponents of the
JCPOA often warn of an imminent nuclear arms race in
the Middle East. Not trusting Iran’s assurances that its
nuclear program is purely civilian in nature, other regional states would themselves develop or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons. Most frequently mentioned candidates
for such actions are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. The
subsequently unfolding nuclear arms race, so the argument goes, would be highly undesirable particularly as
the Middle East has for decades shown to be a high-tense
region with many ongoing and looming intra- and interstate conflicts. Therefore, opponents of the JCPOA reiterate
that anti-Iranian sanctions should stay in place until the
country terminates its nuclear program.
Iranian cheating on the nuclear deal is possible, however
unlikely, because, from the perspective of the Iranian regime, the risk-benefit-analysis clearly pleads against such
actions.
Simply put, Iran would have too much to lose once the
deal with the P5+1 becomes operational. The JCPOA provides for the suspension of the international sanctions that
had been imposed with respect to Iran’s nuclear program.
This would allow the crippled Iranian economy to recover.
Large parts of the Iranian population have been suffering
significantly under the consequences of the sanctions, as
unemployment rates and cost of living rose while important goods such as medication became scarce commodity.
So far, the Iranian people have not risen up against the
regime in reaction to the international sanctions-related
decline of quality of life. This was partially due to the regime’s ability to play the nationalist card and blame the
imperialist West and particularly the United States for
their anti-Iranian policies. In addition, following the Iranian regime’s brutal crackdown on demonstrators following the 2009 Green Revolution, many Iranians do not
dare to protest against their government’s policies.
However, should international sanctions be re-imposed
in consequence of the discovery of Iranian cheating – the
JCPOA allows for the re-imposition of all sanctions without a new UN Security Council resolution in case of Iranian violation of the treaty provisions –, the Iranian people
might no longer remain quiet. This time, it would be much
more likely that they would blame their government for
The best possible compromise?
Both the United States and Israel have emphasized
for years that they would prevent Iran with all necessary
means from becoming a nuclear-weapon state. Against
this backdrop, the JCPOA offers the Iranian regime the
best possible compromise. The international community
and most importantly the U.S. government recognize the
Iranian regime and its right to operate a civilian nuclear
program. At least the current U.S. administration now
deals w