Scorched earth: The geopolitical landscape
of the Middle East
by John Bell
Today’s Middle East is marked by a weakened Arab
world and a strengthened role for non-Arab countries
such as Iran, Turkey and Israel. Generally, they are setting the agenda to which Arabs react. A weakened Arab
world, however, is not good news for the Middle East.
The risks of all sinking together are not low.
In June 1967, the Arab world crumbled. This may
seem like a harsh indictment, given that there remains
an Arab-speaking world, full of political convulsions,
and individuals striving for the better. However, as
of that date, the Arab world ceased to be a confident,
hopeful and striving entity, and slowly but surely it began to slip behind other nations in the region.
Over time, Turkey, Iran, and, the cause of the 1967
debacle, Israel, all grew stronger than the Arab states,
creating the distraught geopolitics of today. Despite
some relative success at the fringes, in some of the Maghreb countries for example, where distance from the
corrupted centre and differences in culture added up to
less political volatility, and the Gulf, where small popu-
lations with petro-dollars learned to thrive in particular
ways, the rest grew slowly poorer and weaker.
Three countries - Turkey, Iran and Israel - rushed
in to fill the void of power. They competed with each
other, and yet also ravaged the remains of the Arabs.
These changes are today at another shift point: the
nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 has many geopolitical implications. It’s a point of rebalancing and the
stakes are high. All around, the threat of disorder due to
state weakness prevails, a condition abetted by the very
players who may one day suffer from it.
Turkey
Turkey rose to prominence with sudden socio-economic development over the last 15 years. The nexus
between global markets and middle class enterpreneurship propelled this country to burgeoning economic success, and its frequent corollary, political hubris.
President Erdogan, and his intellectualized deputy
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threat. The intensified search for Kurdish independence first grew into a problem in the heart of Turkey,
in its very parliament in the June 2015 election, and,
now after the second election in the same year, apparently into someth ing approaching civil war.
Turkey’s underbelly is vulnerable as its southern
neighbours convulse - partly due to Turkey’s own policies. The rise of the Kurds, alongside Syrian and Iraqi
disintegration, mean that the region’s concerns are
dangerously seeping into Turkey. This country may
well be catching the virus in the region: the dangerous
and destabilzing equation of spiralling political dynamics, followed by oppression, and resulting in further
violence.
Turkey may now have to deal with a version of what
many Arab states have already suffered. Its military
power remains significant, its economy far ahead of the
Arabs; however, all this depends on internal stability
which now seems shaky.
Ahmet Davutoglo, reflected the memories of the Ottomans. This time, sage Davuotoglu said, it would not
be empire but ‘zero problems with neighbours’: Kurds,
Armenians, Syria, even Israel. There would be a collegial and cooperative approach to all. As long as everyone would make money, and as long as Turkey’s preeminent role would become, even subtlely, recognized.
Tourists poured into Antalya, and free trade and movement linked the country with Lebanon, Syria and
Jordan. Turkey seemed like the future, and the leader
of the region. Then, the Mavi Marmara incident and
wars in Gaza spoiled relations with Israel, and Assad’s
broken promises to Erdogan sealed the end of that relationship. Zero problems became many problems. The
future did not turn out to be as pleasant as it would
seem.
In reality, Turkey has been big on words and light
on action and new troubles have arrived: the electoral
success of the pro-Kurdish party combined with rise of
Kurdish autonomy in Syria and Iraq represent a real
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