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focused forum for cooperation to a wide range of issue topics relating to regional development
(Axworthy, Koivurova & Hasanat 2012; Pedersen 2012). This marks both the growing importance of
the Arctic region in general, as well as the growing importance of the AC itself, as the ‘pre-eminent
forum for international cooperation in the Arctic’ (Clinton, quoted in Pedersen 2012: 149). A few
recent binding agreements aside, one of the major successes of the AC may be the sheer interaction of
states on an equal playing-field; in particular states whose officials are otherwise prone to bilateral
dialogue-aversion (see e.g. Byers 2010).
Nevertheless, with no decision-making abilities, but only ‘soft’ power, relying on the cooperative spirit
of the member states, concerns have been raised that the AC remains a weak institution, ill-equipped
for the concurrent surge in Arctic interest, stakeholders, and temperatures (Heininen & Nicol 2007;
Koivurova 2010; Koivurova & Vand erZwaag 2007; Young 2012). However, the AC has since its
nascent days been seen as demonstrative of peaceful cooperation in the Arctic (Young 2005), and has
consequently taken on a symbolic significance, reifying states’ positions in anticipation of Arctic
prosperity (Steinberg, Bruun & Medby 2014; Steinberg & Dodds 2013). These hopes of prosperity
are, of course, particularly linked to future shipping and resource opportunities, which in turn are
contingent on peaceful and orderly relations. It is also, as international law’s diplomatic counterpart,
mutually reinforcing and reinforced by UNCLOS, recently making recognition of the latter a criterion
for Observer status in the former (Graczyk & Koivurova 2014). Thus, albeit it holds no ‘hard’ power
to determine states’ behaviour in the region, the AC is instrumental both for norm-setting and for the
reification of a specific Arctic understanding where cooperation is the only obvious, and indeed
possible, political practice.
Norway: A case study of Arctic state identity
As one of the A8, and also among the even more exclusive five littoral states, Norway has both land
and sea territories in the Arctic, is home to an indigenous Sami population, and has a long history of
polar exploration. The basis upon which an ‘Arctic identity’ may be constructed are therefore
numerous, and have led the government to designate the Arctic, or ‘the High North’,1 as Norway’s
‘most important strategic priority area’ (N.M.F.A. 2014). Norway may indeed be particularly
advantageously positioned in the current political ordering of the Arctic, as it grants them both high
status (Wilson Rowe 2014; see also Carvalho & Neumann 2015) and a ‘great power’-role in e.g.
hydrocarbon extraction (Rottem, Hønneland & Jensen 2008; see also e.g. Hønneland & Jensen 2008;
Jensen 2007; Kristoffersen & Jensen 2012). Thus, as a state with much to gain from its formal status
as an Arctic state, Norway serves as an illustrative example of how this rather recent title may (or may
not) translate to a self-perception among state officials as representing such; and, furthermore, to what
extent this status may impact governance and regime adherence in the Arctic.
In order to assess how state representatives perceive Norway’s role in the region a series of anonymous
interviews were conducted with officials in various positions at the state-level.2 Altogether 16
interviewees shared their reflections on the topic, allowing for qualitative analysis of dominant
discourses that may serve to legitimise or de-legitimise options of political behaviour available at the
Big Fish in a Small (Arctic) Pond