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Arctic Yearbook 2015
Statements by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Senior Arctic Official Vladimir Barbin,
former Senior Arctic Official Anton Vasiliev, and Russia’s Envoy to NATO Alexander Grushko were
primarily selected for understanding the foreign discourse. Statements by the President of Russia
Vladimir Putin, the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for International
Cooperation in the Arctic and Antarctic Artur Chilingarov, and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu were
very much targeted at both audiences. Domestic discourse was identified by using the viewpoints from
the Chairman of the Arctic Commission Dmitry Rogozin, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai
Patrushev, and sectoral ministers.
The messages for foreign audiences were searched using the keywords in English, whereas for
domestic audiences, in Russian. In total, more than 40 documents – publications and broadcasts in
the media, and the speeches of officials – were selected. The selection of documents was completed,
when no new relevant information for the period from 2013 to 2015 was provided. The analysis was
qualitative and inductive. The analytical categories were defined through text analysis, based on the
interpretation and explanation of the researcher. It is especially important to mention that foreign and
domestic discourse cannot be treated as separate entities – they have to be viewed in interaction,
because in this way a better insight into its political use by Russia is provided.
Governmental discourse on the Russian Arctic
Five categories of analysis were defined for structuring Russian Arctic foreign and domestic discourse
as used by Russian officials: 1) Russia’s national interests in the Arctic; 2) international cooperation;
3) Russia’s perception of other countries’ strategies; 4) militarization of the Arctic; and 5) symbolic
actions. The statements by Russian officials were arranged and analysed according to these categories.
Table 1 at the end of the article contains a summary of the findings.
Russia’s national interests in the Arctic
The Arctic is a region of historical importance for Russia’s strategic development and its national pride
(Laruelle 2014). In the last decade, it once again became one of the priority regions for Russia after a
period in oblivion during the collapse of the USSR. The strategic importance of the Arctic has been
stressed by several top officials. In 2013, V. Putin noted that Russia had returned to a very promising
region – the Arctic; therefore it should have all the levers for the protection of security and national
interests there (Forbes 2013). Around the same time, the importance of the Arctic was also underlined
by S. Shoigu (Rossiya 1 2013). A. Chilingarov stated that Russia’s future was inextricably lin ked with
the fate of the polar regions, and their development should be a national priority. This is mainly
because, in the future, the Arctic will become the main resource base for the country – it is estimated
that by 2050, the Arctic shelf will provide 20 to 30% of total Russian oil production (Rikin 2014).
During the meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation in 2014 on the implementation
of state policy in the Arctic, V. Putin pointed out the main steps to be taken to preserve influence in
the region. He defined six key tasks: 1) to improve the quality of governance by establishing the Arctic
Commission; 2) to implement the State Program of the Russian Federation ‘Socio-economic development of the
Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period till 2020’; 3) to implement the international legal
Foreign & Domestic Discourse on the Russian Arctic