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as the main motivation for the Arctic Council’s establishment. Canada’s Northern Strategy stresses
the Arctic Council’s key role in developing a “common agenda” among Arctic states (Canada 2009:
35). It underscores the need for Canada to work closely with its Arctic neighbours to achieve the
Arctic states’ “common goals” and emphasizes interests that Canada shares with its Arctic neighbours,
such as climate change adaptation, oil and gas development, oceans management and scientific
cooperation (Canada 2009: 33 and 35). The United States’ National Strategy for the Arctic Region, for
its part, insists on “common interests” that make Arctic states ideal partners of cooperation (U.S.
2013: 9). It highlights the successful cooperation within the Arctic Council, considered a facilitator of
cooperation on “myriad issues of mutual interest,” and notes that cooperation has led to “much
progress on issues of common concern,” such as search and rescue as well as pollution prevention
and response (U.S. 2013: 2 and 9). Although the Strategy concedes that Arctic states share “common
objectives in the Arctic region” with non-Arctic states and other non-Arctic stakeholders, it asserts
that these objectives must be advanced “in a manner that protects Arctic states’ national interests and
resources” (U.S. 2013: 10). Yet, John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, when taking over the chairmanship
of the Arctic Council in Iqaluit in 2015, explicitly called on the “entire world” to address climate
change, the region’s biggest challenge (Kerry 2015). It remains to be seen whether this marks a shift
in attitude and whether this “shared responsibility” will indeed yield greater weight for non-Arctic
states in Arctic cooperation, as these states have long sought.
Statements from the realm of non-Arctic states have indeed long conveyed the idea that the Arctic is
a global common, or at least of global interest. One of the clearest and most striking expressions of
global commonality has been to label the “Arctic” as “common heritage of mankind” (Shackelford
2009). The former German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle (2012: 3), used this qualification to
describe the Arctic Ocean, whereas Georg Witschel (2010: 34), legal adviser of the German Foreign
Office, mentioned it with reference to the high seas of the Arctic Ocean, clarifying however that “[t]his
[concept was] particularly relevant as far as sea-bed resources [were] concerned.”
While Chinese academics are more vocal than Chinese officials (Alexeeva & Lasserre 2013), some
striking statements are attributable to the official realm. Qu Tanzhou, director of the Chinese Arctic
and Antarctic Administration, is quoted as having mentioned the concept of “common heritage of
mankind” in a blurred reference to the Arctic high seas and “resources in the seabed” (Wang 2010;
Chinese (slightly different) version: 王茜 2010). Hu Zhengyue, China’s assistant Foreign Minister, called
on Arctic states to bear in mind the relationship between the extended continental shelf and the
international seabed areas, “which are a common heritage of humankind” (Hu 2009). In their English
translation, his words were sometimes received as establishing a link between the coastal States’
continental shelves and the international Area (Chao 2013: 482; Wright 2011: 29). The Chinese Rear
Admiral, Yin Zhuo is quoted as saying in 2010 that “[a]ccording to the UN law of the Sea, the North
Pole and areas surrounding it do not belong to any country but are common wealth of the whole
human population” (Kopra 2013: 110). Yin Zhuo reportedly said, with respect to the Arctic Ocean,
that “except for areas of territorial sea, all other parts [were] international waters” and thus a “common
legacy of humankind,” which he considered a longstanding legal basis (Anonymous 2013a).
The Common Arctic