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hope for is the development of a long-term problem solving or management capacity (Weber &
Khademian 2008).
Van Bueren, Klijn and Koppenjan (2003) point to three types of uncertainty that characterize wicked
problems: cognitive, strategic, and institutional uncertainty. Cognitive uncertainty reflects the basic
lack of technical knowledge about the “causes and effects” of wicked problems, and also about the
causal relationships between issues involved (van Bueren et al 2003: 193). Strategic uncertainty grows
out the number of actors involved, who have differing perceptions of the problem, differing solutions,
and therefore differing strategies for engaging with the problem. These differences can lead to conflict,
stagnation, and potentially unexpected outcomes (van Bueren et al 2003: 193). Institutional uncertainty
is a result of the “highly fragmented” institutional setting in which wicked problems are addressed.
Decision-making is distributed across a variety of institutional arenas. “Often, decisions are only
loosely coupled and sometimes not at all” (van Bueren et al. 2003: 194). Given these conditions,
“dealing with wicked problems is—to a large extent—a problem of interaction” (Ibid).
Wicked problems are frustrating, complex, and pose special challenges to policymakers. They
challenge assumptions about rational and logical approaches to addressing public policy problems.
Arctic emergency response: a wicked problem
All of the characteristics discussed previously as distinctive of wicked problems are in ample evidence
in the maritime Arctic realm. Although May et al. (2005) use the label “policy incoherence”, much of
their analysis also characterizes wicked policy problems: they note the uncertainty and “limited shared
basis for constructing definitions of problems” in the Arctic (2005: 4). The fundamental difficulty in
the Arctic is twofold: responding to a rapidly warming regional climate and simultaneously managing
an increase in human activity. Change is cascading through both human and environmental systems
in the Arctic region, and the difficulty of managing and adapting to these changes is therefore
significantly more challenging. The realm of emergency response is perhaps the most pressing
challenge facing governments in the North American and Siberian regions of the Arctic, where
increased human activity is occurring in the absence of fully developed infrastructure.
Although the policy solutions to inadequate emergency response infrastructure may appear simple—
build infrastructure and increase staffing—this simplicity is deceptive. Construction and maintenance
of infrastructure in the far North is complicated by the extreme climate, which requires special
materials, techniques, and maintenance. These considerations multiply costs considerably. Seasonal
limitations on construction exist. In addition, the costs of transporting construction materials to
remote Arctic locations are significant. For example, while the price of a gallon of gas in the “lower
48” of the US was around $2.50 during April 2015, in Barrow, Alaska, it was approximately $7.00.
While infrastructure development is a costly undertaking in any circumstance, the enormous additional
costs of Arctic development pose challenges for policymakers.
Compounding the extreme cost of infrastructure development for emergency response in the Arctic
is the uncertainty associated with ship traffic. If policymakers commit to public spending now in order
to improve emergency response, and traffic does not increase, the money will be seen as going to
Pincus