Arctic Yearbook 2014
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the legally binding treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe appear to be too overdrawn
considering the current level of cooperation in the Arctic.
When it comes to the question of which categories of military equipment should be included in the
exchange of military information, countries should not only take into account currently used and
deployed equipment in the area. Instead, their decision should already consider today that the
melting environment and the associated increase in the general temperature levels, might open up
the Arctic for more different categories of conventional weapon systems, even though they are by
today not able to operate in the area (Lind 2014; Wezeman 2014).
A final thought shall be dedicated to the inclusion of submarine vessels. While already forming one
of the major present forces in the Arctic nowadays (Lind 2014; Wezeman 2014; Bergh 2014),
information exchanges and especially measures of verification outside their peacetime locations
appear extremely difficult and of highly sensitive military nature. This holds especially true as
submarines form a major component of some Arctic states’ nuclear deterrence (Lind 2014;
Wezeman 2014; Bergh 2014). While submarine vessels if submerged are not detectable through
aerial observation and hence countries invest large amounts of resources in techniques which ensure
that they remain undetected, it appears least likely that they would agree to any form of verification
which suddenly makes these vessels detectable. A workaround for this problem could nevertheless
lie in the division of the Arctic seas into larger sectors, for which the entrance and departure of
submarine vessels should be made notifiable. Such sectors of course need to be defined large
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