Arctic Yearbook 2014 - Page 441

Arctic Yearbook 2014 441 At this point it shall also be noted that CSBMs also differ from classical approaches of disarmament as they “do not seek to limit forces in terms of quantity or quality, but rather control and communicate how, when, where and why military activities are employed. They are intended to mitigate the possibility of conflict occurring through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication, and to diminish opportunities for political coercion and surprise attack” (Borawski 1986: 113). CSBMs and the Reduction of the Levels of Private Information in Interstate Bargaining Situations Based on the above presented definition of CSBMs, it is possible to identify and deduce the following three causal mechanisms through which they appear able to reduce the level of private information and thus also the likelihood of interstate armed conflict: 1. Exchange of military information; 2. Verification of compliance with agreed commitments; 3. Different forms of military co-operation. This reduction of private information can already be considered to have a structural conflict preventing effect, as it increases the accuracy of the calculations of both sides’ military capabilities: “In principle, both sides could gain by sharing information, which would yield a consensus military estimate [...] [and] doing so could not help but reveal bargains that both would prefer to a fight” (1995: 393). It can thus be assumed that the mechanism of ‘military information exchange’ forms th B