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Arctic Yearbook 2014
prevailing market and regulatory conditions.’ Regulatory frameworks will be set first and
foremost by the states in whose jurisdiction the activity occurs. However, the UK will give
advice where asked and will press for ‘the highest environmental and drilling standards in the
Arctic, as elsewhere’ (an implicit reference to expertise gained in the North Sea). It will support
stronger anti-pollution standards for shipping in the Arctic – within the IMO framework –
‘where scientific evidence demonstrates’ a practical need for this. Future Arctic fisheries should
be handled on a precautionary principle, with especial prudence where the prospects for a given
stock are not clear: decisions should be taken (in the UK’s case, through the EU) on scientific
evidence and with a view to sustainability. The section ends with another page of case-studies on
British inputs to climate science, mentioning among others UK expertise on ice observation and
the study of ocean circulation, and UK leadership in the EU’s forthcoming ICEARC research
project.
While prosaically expressed without talk of extreme climate scenarios (or indeed, of existing and
ongoing environmental damage), this section situates the UK in a responsible European
mainstream as regards the mitigation of climate change and concern for biodiversity. It implies
support for further regulation of Arctic shipping (a topic currently on the table in the IMO) and
for prudent management of new Arctic fisheries, where EU documents have mooted a
moratorium.36 Again, there is a marked emphasis on science; but this also implies reservations
about more extreme conservationist positions not backed by specific evidence of environmental
risk. Critics of the document’s pro-business bias could point, further, to the laisser-faire tone of
the reference to business development, which by emphasizing national jurisdiction seems to be
coming down against new international rules – even of a business-generated and voluntary
nature.37
Commercial Dimension
The statement that decisions on business development will be taken by companies themselves,
and that regulation will be provided nationally, is repeated twice more on the first page of this
section. The UK’s approach is defined as ‘to support legitimate and responsible business
activity’, since ‘people in the Arctic, as elsewhere, have a right to pursue economic prosperity’.
Companies should be encouraged to discuss the issues themselves with the AC and other
stakeholders, and a case-study explains how a UK-based firm has worked with local reindeerherders while developing a mining project on the far North of Finland.
The document then identifies energy, shipping, tourism, fisheries, and (more unusually) bioprospecting as key commercial sectors. The energy page reduces to a single argument: that the
world, including the UK, will need more gas imports in future, so the UK should support further
Norwegian production in the High North (and help finance new infrastructure connections, as
necessary). On shipping, the UK strongly supports taking any necessary measures within the
IMO and on the basis of UNCLOS, and rejects any ‘fundamental changes to existing regimes’.
The UK hopes that its ports, shipping companies and ‘maritime cluster’ can share in any profits
from new Arctic shipping routes, and the government will consider whether to do or propose
anything particular in this context. As for safety and environmental risks linked with shipping,
the UK ‘will play a leading role in the development of the mandatory Polar Code’ – actually
scheduled for discussion at the IMO in 2014 – ‘so as to ensure it comprehensively addresses
safety and environmental issues, and press for its early adoption’. Here the document does finally
The Arctic’s Nearest Neighbour