AmCham Macedonia Spring 2015 (Issue 45) | Page 8

ANALYSIS Pan-European Infringements: Authors: Leonid Ristev, Attorney of Law in cooperation with Karanović & Nikolić and    Božidar Milošević, Associate Just because you can’t see anti-competitive behavior doesn’t mean it isn’t there. On the contrary, secrecy is a key element for the existence of cartels and an impediment to eliminating them. For this reason, competition authorities are constantly trying to find mechanisms that will enable effective cartel detection. In this regard, the European Commission (“Commission”), the authority charged with enforcing EU competition rules, outlines its “leniency policy” as a very successful tool for this purpose. The leniency policy is the possibility for involved companies to report a competition infringement to the Commission (or to another competent authority in another jurisdiction) in exchange for full immunity or at least a reduction of the potential fine. Only one leniency applicant can benefit from full immunity of the fine, in most cases, the first company that provides sufficient information and evidence for initiating an investigation or proving the infringement (in case an investigation is already underway). As companies pursue cross-border activities beyond EU jurisdiction, primarily into neighboring countries aspiring toward membership (“Accession Countries”) 1 , alleged infringements are increasing likely to affect these markets as well. Thus, in the case of transnational cartels, potential “whistle blowers’ must file leniency applications with the EU Commission and with the competent authority in any affected non-EU jurisdiction. In other words, a competition infringement can easily spill-over, while an EU Commission leniency application might not. Pan-European Impacts Considering that anti-competitive behavior among companies is hard to identify and prove, over the last 10 years the Commission intensified its promotion of the leniency policy on both the EU and national levels. In line with the promotion, the Commission presented the European Competition Network Model Leniency Program, a document designed to provide legal certainty to leniency applicants despite dealing with different competition regulators. More practical in its approach, the Model Program introduced a uniform summary application system which enables involved companies within the program’s scope to file a full-form leniency application to the Commission and a short-form application to the relevant Member State authority. 1 For the purposes of this article, the term “Accession Countries” encompasses the countries that showed willingness to become Member States of the EU by fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria. This includes, inter alia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. 8   Spring 2015 Issue 45