It is worth pointing that DR Congo as a country
is one of the poorest in the world, with a GDP
per capita of just U$ 655 Million (IMF, 2013) which means thirty residents earn as much as
just one from Equatorial Guinea (the richest
African country). To place things in perspective
- the average American makes as much in just
four days as someone from DR Congo does in
a year. Thus, the spending power of Congolese
football fans must be miniscule, and any
increase in cost of watching football live or on
TV - which comes naturally with increased
demand for the league - will surely deter their
interest. This unfortunate but all so real 'dead
end' will most probably prevent the Central
Africans from being recognized as one of the
richest football leagues in the world for the
foreseeable future.
Now let's turn briefly to some of the
federations who have entertained the other
route mentioned in the intro of this piece –
which is by profiting from the export of young
players.
The best way to measure which nations' clubs
and academies have sold the greatest
percentage of their talents elsewhere is to see
how much of the national squads are made of
domestically or overseas based footballers.
Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Mali and Ghana for
example can name just two players of their
national squads between them that are based
on home soil - that's half a player per 26 in all
on average. But then these quartet of countries
are also four of the highest ranked in Africa, but
how has this correlation occurred?
Simply as mentioned earlier, the majority of
these countries' squads are made up of players
in top European leagues - playing in the UEFA
Champions League with the globe's elite stars
on a regular basis, upping their level with each
game as they compete with opponents and
teammates for a precious spot in the starting
eleven. And when it comes to international duty,
they can readily transfer skills, fitness and
commitment that proves successful - be it in the
AFCONs or World Cups.
However, this only tends to bring about a
short burst of on-pitch victory, with a rather
lackluster football structure maintained in their
home nations. Some money can be earned for
the birth clubs and leagues from the initial sale
of a player, particularly if their pedigree and
prospect is credited by scouts, thus raising
transfer market value. But they are still sold
young, before they can really benefit their club
and country of origin. If the likes of Mali and
Ghana introduce policies in this arena on the
maximum quota of players that could exit per
year, then at least some world class players
would by chance remain. Which would the
translate to an improvement of the standard of
play in teams across their local leagues, getting
them to eventually win more continental
trophies, and attendances numbers will
skyrocket, as will advertising and broadcast
revenues because local and continental
companies based in the country or the
continent will want to endorse a winning
prodigy. This will mean that the national side
would not lose out, as players will be playing at
a high club level - in several different leagues
both at home and overseas.
In the final analysis the best - somewhat
untried strategy to date - is a combination of the
two. The trade-off hinted at in the opening
becomes more of a compromise. That is the
only way domestic divisions can benefit handin-hand with the international side by becoming
economically stable in both fields,
and ultimately revel in a thriving national joy
that is exemplified by both Cote D'Ivoire (a
national team of overseas professionals) and a
solid popular domestic leagues like that of
Egypt.