45179_towardssaferschoolconstruction_0 (2015) - Page 31

Stakeholder (dis)incentives for supporting safer school construction Disincentives • Safety of self and school-age family members • Low risk awareness • Acquisition of hazard-resistant construction knowledge and skills • Local jobs Development organisations • Fulfilment of organisation’s mandate • Visibility of organisation • Lack of confidence in risk-reduction techniques • School disruption for retrofitting projects • Mistrusting non-community members • Lack of technical and financial capabilities to invest in safer construction • More effective long-term investment • Lack of government or donor interest Program manager • Desire for high-quality output • Low risk awareness or disaster riskreduction knowledge Local government • Protection of citizens • Increase local capacity to deal with hazards • Extra workload for construction supervision and support Central government • Protection of infrastructure investment • Competing budgetary items, such as teachers’ salaries, educational materials and training • Higher visibility in other actions or sectors SECTION II: OVERVIEW School community Incentives • Perceived trade-offs with speed, quantity and cost • Use of safer schools as shelters • Education continuity in emergencies and disasters • Lack of technical capacity in hazardresistant design and construction • Safety and wellbeing of citizens, especially future generations • Lack of confidence in disaster riskreduction effectiveness Technical Professionals • Income generation, analysis, site planning and hazard-resistant design • Lack of expertise in hazard-resistant design • Academic interest • Higher investment of time needed compared to common (unsafe) practices Policy and decision-makers • Infrastructure and community protection • Lack of political incentives • Community development • Lack of funding and other resources • Fulfilment of international commitments • Donor dependency • Lack of human resources to carry out the program • Moral hazard: may gain more political clout by responding to catastrophic disasters than quietly averting them 22